An annual review of women’s and gender studies by Birzeit University. Institute of Women's Studies

Volume 3  2005
An annual review of women’s 
and gender studies
Institute of Women’s Studies
Birzeit University
layout-V3E.indd   1 09/11/1426, 05:32:34 ã
Editors:
Jamil Hilal (Arabic)
Penny Johnson (English)
Copyright Institute of Women’s Studies.
Published in 2005 by the Institute of Women’s Studies, Birzeit University.
POB 14, Birzeit, Palestine.
Telephone: 02-2982959
Fax: 02-2982958
For more information:
http://home.birzeit.edu/wsi
Price:
20 Israeli shekels (local)
$8 U.S. dollars (international)
ISBN 9950-322-02-2
Design: Palitra Graphic Design
Printed: Studio Alpha
layout-V3E.indd   2 09/11/1426, 05:32:34 ã
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 5
ARTICLES
     Re-Reading the Mandate: 8
Palestinian Women and the Double Jeopardy 
of Colonialism
     Islah Jad
     The Other Wall 30
     Banned Marriages and Fragmented 
Citizenships in Israel and Palestine
     Édouard Conte
     The Rise and Fall of a Patriarch: 52
A Palestinian Household in Cooperation 
and Conflict
     Lamis Abu Nahleh
     Naming the Crime: ‘Honour’, Rights and Wrongs 67
     Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain
SURVEY RESULTS
     Amari Refugee Camp 80
in Comparison with its Neighbors
     Stability, Transformations, Vulnerability
     Penny Johnson
DOCUMENT
     Meeting the Housing Needs 94
of Palestinian Women and Men: 
Conclusions and Recommendations
     Eileen Kuttab, Randa Nassar, Lina Mi’ari
The Arabic Table of Contents may be found at the beginning 
of the Arabic Section.
layout-V3E.indd   3 09/11/1426, 05:32:34 ã
layout-V3E.indd   4 09/11/1426, 05:32:35 ã
5Review of  Women Studies |
INTRODUCTION
This is the third issue of the annual Review of Women’s Studies, 
published by the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University. The 
Review features recent research and writing by the Institute’s faculty and 
graduate students, but also publishes other interesting and trend-setting 
work by scholars in Palestine and abroad that advances understanding of 
gender issues in Palestinian society in a range of disciplines. In this regard, 
this issue is fortunate to publish recent work by international scholars Dr. 
Edouard Conte, and Dr. Lynn Welchman and attorney Sara Hosain, as well 
as contributions from senior scholars in Palestine: Dr. Khalil Athamneh, 
Dr. Fayha Abdul Hadi, and Dr. Randa Nasser. 
One main theme of this Review is research that presents new 
approaches and material on gender and Palestinian history, whether Islah 
Jad on gender, colonialism and nationalism under the British Mandate, 
Khalil Athamneh on concubines and prostitution in Arab pre-Islamic 
society, Fayha Abdul Hadi on remembering Deir Yassin, Rabiha ‘Alan on 
the role of village women in the 1948 Nakba, or Randa Nasser and her 
students on the crucial role of women’s everyday activities in family and 
community survival in Jalazoun camp in the first years after the nakba. 
The last three researhers employ oral history to capture history from the 
ground up – and to understand how everyday activities make history, 
a theme explored culturally by Abu Dahu in her brief review of a book 
and film exploring the ordinary lives of Palestinians in the extraordinary 
circumstances of the Nakba and exile.
This same understanding informs ethnographic work on the present 
crisis: Lamis Abu Nahleh uses narratives to probe changes in gender 
relations in a Ramallah-area family that are triggered both by intifada-
related economic crisis and the death of a patriarch, while Amira Silmi 
explores the lives and perceptions of two young single women who come 
to Ramallah in order to find employment in the difficult circumstances of 
the second intifada. Johnson’s analysis of survey results from an ongoing 
Institute research project in three Ramallah-area communities examines 
households in Amari refugee camp in relation to its neighbors, identifying 
both differences and commonalities.
Edouard Conte’s contribution exposes another link between social, 
political and physical transformations. He argues that new Israeli legal 
restrictions on marriage and residency constitute “another wall” similar 
in purpose to the physical wall now being erected on Palestinian land with 
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disastrous human, economic and political consequences. Also shedding 
light on an issue of public discussion and debate in Palestine today, is 
Welchman and Hosain’s thoughtful introduction to a volume on “honor 
crimes.” Two seminar papers by the Institute’s graduate students also 
explore contemporary issues of great relevance: women and local elections 
(Nadia Hajal-Boqla) and the policies and practices of formal assistance 
to wives of Palestinian martyrs (Hanan Ma’di). Finally, an excerpt from 
a recent study of gender and housing conditions by an Institute team 
headed by Eileen Kuttab focuses attention on an priority area for policy 
intervention and gender-sensitive developmental, economic and legal 
initiatives. 
We hope readers will find this issue rich in insights and stimulating for 
new directions for research. Articles are in their original language, so the 
contents of the Arabic and English section are different. The editors and 
the Institute hope that the Review will encourage more research on these 
topics, but even more important, discussion and debate on the pressing 
issues facing Palestinian society.
The Editors
Ramallah, November 2005
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Re-Reading the Mandate: 
Palestinian Women and the Double 
Jeopardy of Colonialism
Islah Jad
Islah Jad explores the roots of Palestinian women’s 
subordination and the relationships and tensions among gender, 
class, colonialism and nationalism that have shaped the Palestinian 
women’s movement through a careful scrutiny of the seminal period 
of the British Mandate. This article is taken from sections of the first 
two chapters of Jad’s Ph.D. thesis “Women at the Crossroads: The 
Palestinian Women’s Movement Between Nationalism, Secularism 
and Islamism.” Jad was awarded her Ph.D. from the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London 
in 2004. Other chapters from her dissertation which examine the 
trajectory of the Palestinian women’s movement, including an 
analysis of post-Oslo developments and a groundbreaking chapter 
on contemporary Islamic women’s movements in Palestine, will 
be published in Arabic by Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for 
the Study of Democracy, in 2006. Islah Jad teaches in the master’s 
program of the Institute of Women’s Studies and in the Department 
of Cultural Studies at Birzeit University.
The evolution of the Palestinian women’s movements is deeply linked 
to the turbulent and contested history of Palestine in the twentieth century. 
This history has been shaped by multiple influences, including successive 
waves of colonization, starting from the Ottomans (1516-1918), followed 
by British Occupation and the British Mandate over Palestine (1920-
1948), and finally, with the Zionist colonial settler project commencing 
at the turn of the century (Rodinson 1973). Palestinian nationalism and 
the Palestinian national movement, its politics, organisational forms and 
options are embedded in multiple contexts and contestations: between the 
colonising/developed West versus the underdeveloped/colonised peoples, 
and more recently, the struggle of the Palestinian national movement for 
independent statehood resulting in the establishment of a quasi-state 
under Occupation. Every change at the national level has had significant 
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effects on women’s mobilisation and movements. Since the legacies of 
various colonial encounters live on to this day, it is important to take stock 
of their influence on Palestinian society.
In this article, I will attempt to explain how the British call for 
‘advancing the natives’ and ‘modernising’ them under the Mandate, was 
largely adopted by the Palestinian urban middle class, as was the case in 
most colonised countries (Chatterjee 1993; Mohanty 1991; Massad 2001; 
Thompson 2000; Fleischmann 2003). Depicting the ‘natives’, in particular 
their women, as ‘traditional’, ‘backward’ and ‘superstitious’, the British 
Mandate administration implemented policies that had paradoxical effects 
on all spheres of life. The modernising factor of universal education, while 
playing an important role in constituting a ‘modern’ notion of Palestinian 
nationalism by bringing together thousands of young men through the 
unifying process of public education, simultaneously widened social gaps 
between urban and rural, and Muslim and Christian, Palestinians. Similarly, 
while the avowed purpose of the British public administration, according 
to the Mandate, was to enable the transition to ‘native’ self-rule (Mohanty 
1991: 20; Chatterjee 1993), it was also used to facilitate the creation of 
another sub-colonial project inspired by a powerful Zionist national 
movement which led to the uprooting of the ‘natives’ and the destruction 
of their hopes for self-rule and independence. 
Mohanty summarises the symptomatic aspects of the operation 
of imperial rule, around three key elements: 1) the effects of colonial 
institutions and policies in transforming indigenous patriarchies and 
consolidating hegemonic middle-class cultures in metropolitan and 
colonised areas; 2) the ideological construction and consolidation of 
white masculinity as normative and the corresponding racialisation and 
sexualisation of colonised peoples and 3) the rise of feminist politics and 
consciousness in this historical context within and against the framework of 
national liberation movements (Mohanty 1991: 15). In the same vein, many 
scholars have demonstrated how colonial policies, laws and institutional 
practices, are a crucial process for social control. These studies revealed 
the effect of colonial policies on existing sexual divisions of labour, class 
hierarchies and patriarchies (Omvedt 1980; Etienne and Leacock 1980; 
Sangari and Vaid 1989; Chowdhry 1989; Chatterjee 1993; Mohanty 1991; 
Waylen 1996). Sangari and Vaid, for example, analysed how the cumulative 
effect of colonial policies and practices led to the aggravation of existing 
inequalities as well as the creation of new ones (Sangari and Vaid 1989: 302-
336). Chowdhry drew attention to the role colonial rule played in ‘fixing’ 
certain customs. Thus patriarchal practices were shaped to serve the 
economic interests of both the landowning classes and the colonial state 
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(Chowdhry 1989: 317). Describing the Indian national struggle Sangari 
and Vaid argue that it incorporated their Victorian rulers’ separation of the 
public and private spheres which enshrined a notion of a pure home-based 
middle-class womanhood. Female emancipation became part of national 
regeneration, reformed around this ideal of restricted womanhood. 
(Sangari and Vaid 1989: 1-26). 
National Elites and the Women Question: 
“Tradition” versus Modernity
In the Middle East, as in India, it was the male middle-class 
national elite which was the key player in the emergence of the ‘woman 
question’1 within the national struggle (Chatterjee 1989, 1990; Badran 
1995; Baron 1994; Kandiyoti 1991, 1998). Thus, male-led social reform 
movements were selectively encouraging women’s entry into the public 
sphere, according to their preoccupation with ‘uplifting’ and ‘advancing’ 
women through religious reform and universal education while at the same 
time ‘redrafting morality’ through propagating the virtue of domesticity 
across the nation (Alexander 1991: 133; Abu Lughod 1998). The women’s 
movements themselves, almost wholly middle-class, attempted to 
‘modernise’ the patriarchal regulation of women and pave the way for 
middle-class women’s entry into the professions and political movements. 
The emergence of women’s struggles in many third world countries, 
including the Middle East, constituted a site of tensions between 
progressive and conservative ideas and modes of action. Their emphasis on 
gender equality in the home and workplace constituted what Sangari and 
Vaid have called ‘democratising’ women’s movements, where both feudal 
and colonial structures are questioned. Nevertheless, this process was 
partially tied to middle-class familial ideologies and agendas as well as to 
feudal patriarchal norms (Sangari and Vaid 1989). This formulation is one 
way of examining the relations between colonialism, class and gender as 
the setting for the emergence of organised struggles, against both a racist, 
paternal, imperial state (Britain and then the Israeli Occupation) and a 
paternal, middle-class national liberation movement. 
One of the ways in which ‘traditionalism’ was defined in Palestinian 
society was by portraying the society as essentially tribal with the hamula 
(extended patrilineage) being the building block of society. Relationships 
and conflicts that might be assessed in other contexts in class terms have 
now been translated into hamula dynamics and politics. In this view, the 
| Re-Reading the Mandate: Palestinian Women and the Double Jeopardy of  Colonialism
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 hamula – understood as patrilineage – functioned as a timeless source 
of identity for villagers, making them easy prey to all forms of colonial 
domination (Nakhleh 1977: 65; Cohen 1965; Rosenfeld 1964; Ma’oz 
1984). Thus, Arab Palestinians were portrayed as intrinsically ‘traditional’ 
and in need of the modernising mission of British colonisers and, later on, 
of Israelis. This view was largely internalised by the nationalist elites who 
saw themselves as the modernisers of their ‘traditional’ rural compatriots. 
This attitude was reflected in the form of relationships between elite and 
rural women. However, there is a vast body of scholarly work that has 
demonstrated that the social structure in Palestine, as elsewhere, was never 
fixed or unchangeable. Both hamula and social classes were in constant 
flux and were affected by economic and political factors (Granqvist 
1931; Al-Haj 1987; Nakhleh 1977; Rothenberg 1999). The depiction 
of Palestinians as ‘traditional’ and impervious to change relates to the 
politics of obfuscating the distorting impact of colonialism and successive 
occupations on the development of the Palestinians. 
Each outside ruler – Britain, Jordan, Egypt, Israel – affected 
Palestinian society and its forms of resistance to outside rule. Here I 
focus on colonisation as an external factor and argue that the Palestinian 
case differs in significant ways from other women’s experiences under 
colonialism due to the ‘double jeopardy’ whereby the Zionist movement, 
which extended colonial rule by its policy of building Jewish settlements 
and uprooting the indigenous population, worked to eliminate whatever 
gains educated national Palestinian elites, including women, might have 
achieved under the British Mandate and later under Israeli domination. I 
also concentrate on the construction of different social classes under the 
British Mandate. I also focus on internal factors such as the political and 
ideological construction of the modern notion of Palestinian nationalism 
and trace the different forms of resistance led by the Palestinian national 
movements and the women’s movements. 
I attempt to show in what follows that while the urban male elite 
managed to transcend their class boundaries to include villagers to form 
an effective national resistance, the middle-class elite of the women’s 
movement, particularly under the British Mandate, was isolated from its 
lower-class constituencies, and unable to link their activism to poorer and 
rural women. Educated women’s activism was both stimulated and at the 
same time undermined by their access to ‘colonial benefits’ (Burke and 
Lapidus 1988; Swedenburg 1988; Waylen 1996) as well as by their class and 
regional backgrounds. The middle-class leadership of women’s movements 
depicted rural women as their traditional ‘other’, needing to be ‘uplifted’ 
in order to achieve progress, as the object of their charity and help, and 
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incapable of organising or resisting. This is not to suggest that there were 
no alternative forms of women’s activism by uneducated or rural women, 
since ‘women’ is not a unitary category and colonialism affected women 
in various positions differently (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Kandiyoti 
1991; Lazreg 1988; Mohanty 1988, 1991; Chinchilla 1992; 1987; Waylen 
1996). I argue that in the case of Palestine, the dynamics of the different 
colonial powers simultaneously constructed the national movement and 
undermined it. 
Unlike other Middle Eastern states where colonial powers eventually 
allowed national elites to flourish and to lead their communities (Sharkey 
2003), British Occupation in Palestine did not foster a native elite to 
facilitate their rule, although native interlocutors were utilized. If the 
proxy rulers in Egypt are Egyptians, in Palestine, their proxies were not 
Arabs but rather the Zionist settlers, despite sharp tensions and conflicts, 
particularly at the end of the Mandate. I present a re-reading of some of 
the conventional sources on the historiography of Palestinian social and 
political history during the British Mandate. I have also conducted key 
informant interviews with some women educated under the British system 
to evaluate its class impact.2 
Colonialism and Zionism: Dynamics of Class and Gender
The British Mandate and the Zionist Movement, through their policies 
and activism, introduced profound changes in class relations in Palestine.3 
One of the most noticeable effects of the British Mandate on Palestine was 
the widening of the social and economic gaps between the rural and urban, 
in general, and between rural and urban women in particular. The colonial 
‘dividends’ were distributed at the extreme expense of rural women 
whether in terms of legislation, work opportunities, education, health, 
social status or political recognition and participation, leading to further 
marginalisation of rural and poorer women. At the same time, Zionist land 
purchase drove peasants off their land in increasing numbers.
The effects of colonialism on gender and gender relations is a growing 
field of study by feminist researchers, which led many to emphasise 
the importance of studying colonialism in order to understand gender 
relations and women’s movements in third world countries (Mohanty 
1988; Jayawardena 1986; Ahmed 1992; Waylen 1996; Smith 1999; 
Thompson 2000; Fleischmann 2003). Major changes are introduced to 
labour markets, land tenure and agricultural systems and social welfare 
provision as well as the distribution of power and political activism, all 
| Re-Reading the Mandate: Palestinian Women and the Double Jeopardy of  Colonialism
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affecting gender and gender relations. In Palestine, the growth of export-
oriented colonial economies and the decline of subsistence agriculture may 
have contributed to a reduction in the status of women, as their access to 
the economic resources of land and labour power decreased while their 
workloads increased. Colonial policies also favoured an individualization 
of property rights and it was generally men who gained land titles, while 
women lost their rights to customary land (Al-Haj 1987). 
The general literature on gender and colonialism in other countries 
points to some features in common with Palestine. It was seen, for 
example, that colonialism leaves its imprints on gender and gender 
relations, to the benefit of urban middle class women. Education was 
one of the important fields in which gender roles were reconstructed by 
colonialism. Staudt noticed for example that “education for girls tended to 
stress the development of qualities, which would make them good wives, 
and mothers and emphasized morality and Christian values” (Parpart and 
Staudt 1989: 76). While girls received education focused on the domestic, 
boys, in addition to receiving the skills necessary for employment in 
European enterprises (for example as clerks), received more technically 
and agriculturally based instruction (ibid: 76). 
Palestine’s experience was similar to that of other societies with 
one major exception: whereas colonial regimes benefited some of the 
colonised, the gains for Palestinians were later reversed by the Israeli 
state that worked to empty the land of its indigenous inhabitants. While 
rural women were depicted by the British Mandate as the residue of 
‘tradition’, ‘superstition’ and ‘prejudice’ (Fleischmann 2003), the urban 
upper class women, usually secluded and with less autonomy over their 
lives, were encouraged to be the repositories of Western values and 
symbols of ‘progress’ in their society. They were relatively more exposed 
to the modernising factors introduced by British colonialism. These could 
include formal education, employment, mass media exposure, affiliation in 
formal organisations, psychological modernity and progressive attitudes 
towards women’s status (Al-Haj 1987: 80). For rural women, however, 
colonial policies led to increased domestication and the enforcement of 
‘traditional’ practices in health service in particular.
Re-reading the Mandate: Gender and the Urban-Rural Divide
The British Mandate’s health policies, for example, contributed 
to changes in gender relations to the detriment of the rural population 
in general and rural women in particular. The government’s practice of 
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dispensing health care, for example, along national, religious, regional and 
gender lines resulted in cleavages in health care and helped to promote 
national, regional and class divisiveness. In the end, the colonial policy of 
spending as little as possible on its colonies had the effect of leaving the 
more substantial expenditures for the Arab sector in the hands of Arab 
civic and voluntary organisations, as it had done for the Jews who were 
more capable through their international connections to obtain funds for 
their organisations. The lack of hospital services for the rural population 
was also accompanied by an acute shortage of health provision in general. 
This policy also reflected itself in different levels of life expectancy and 
child mortality for the different groups. With the lack of vital health 
services for rural areas, traditional medical practices were prevalent among 
peasants in particular in the areas of pregnancy and childbirth, thus 
enforcing the image of rural women’s ‘traditionality’. In 1925, for example, 
about 2 percent of births among Muslims occurred in hospitals, compared 
with 86 percent of births among Jews (Reiss 1996: 317). This also meant 
that children born at home had little or no access to inoculations. This was 
aggravated by the lack of access to schooling, as will be explained later, for 
female children in rural areas.
According to Fleischmann, the British government’s approach to 
health and hygiene conformed to social policies at home, where “the 
principal aim of … child and maternal welfare services [the major focus 
of the health department] was to promote a greater sense of responsibility 
on the part of the mother through ‘education to reform’ her character, 
effectively divesting health issues from their broader social and economic 
context” (Lewis 1980 cited in Fleischmann 2003: 49). There was little 
recognition that most of the remedies advocated by the government did 
not take into account the severe conditions of poverty under which much 
of the population lived. Widespread attempts were made to teach the 
“virtues of cleanliness and how to attain it” (ibid: 49). Few peasants had 
access to enough water for “frequent baths”, or access to “good drinking 
water”, however, which required more than mere “adherence to rules 
of hygiene” (ibid: 49). The British, as the Israelis later on, constructed 
Palestinian society in general and Palestinian rural women in particular 
as ‘traditional’, ‘superstitious’ and subject to ‘prejudice’ (ibid: 51), and 
invoked these factors as the reasons behind the underdevelopment of the 
society. Yet, a woman doctor returning to Nablus from leave who became 
“especially busy as the women had been waiting for her return”, reported 
that women were perfectly willing to seek ‘modern’ medical care when 
accessible and provided by a doctor with whom they felt comfortable. 
Another woman, whose family ran the American Colony’s infant welfare 
| Re-Reading the Mandate: Palestinian Women and the Double Jeopardy of  Colonialism
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centre, recalls that women ‘flocked’ to the centre when it opened in 1927 
(ibid:51). 
Educational Policies and Practices: Rural and Female Disadvantages
Education was another sphere in which women’s domesticity was 
enforced and which ultimately increased rural/urban cleavages and 
alienated middle class women from the rest of the society.
Under Ottoman rule, (native) Arab-Jewish relations in the 
country were based, as was the case between Muslims and Christians, 
on understanding and respect. Shared enrolment of Jewish, Muslim and 
Christian students in the same schools – either the Jewish Alliance Israelite 
schools (established in 1882) or in the Nizamiyyah, the Ottoman public 
schools first established by the Turkish law of 18694 – promoted mutual 
understanding for a small elite. In contrast, the British Mandate policy 
in education played a major role in reshaping national, regional, and class 
and gender identities. It was through education that two separate national 
entities were developed, the urban/rural division was deepened, class 
boundaries rendered unbridgeable and gender identities moulded to suit 
the British model. Education was geared to the benefit of an urban, mostly 
male, elite. A division of public schools along national and linguistic, or 
simply national grounds, into an Arab Public System and a Hebrew Public 
System had its roots in the first formative years of the Mandate (Al-
Tibawi 1956:27-8). The British Education Department exercised direct 
and complete control over the Arab Public system, and an indirect and 
somewhat nominal control over the Jewish system (ibid: 37).
In the British Administration there was a struggle between two 
tendencies: one that insisted on academic subjects geared to educate an 
elite class, and the other pressed the claims of subjects such as agriculture 
and domestic science to “keep the peasants on the land by teaching their 
children farming beside basic education” (ibid: 80). The former tendency 
won and the latter remained merely experimental. That was reflected in 
the number of years of education given for town schools (seven years) as 
opposed to education for village schools (four years) (ibid: 80).
The British Mandate was never able to introduce compulsory 
education or to provide state schools in sufficient numbers to make 
education universal, or failing either, to provide enough places in its 
schools for all those who applied for admission. This was directly due to 
the political commitments of the government and only indirectly to its 
financial circumstances. The Mandate government controlled all services 
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for Palestinians centrally and was particularly ineffective when it came to 
education. In contrast, Jews benefited from autonomy in running their 
institutions and in deciding on the policies they wanted to apply. A report 
on the administration of Palestine for 1932, submitted to the League of 
Nations cited the charge that the government was deliberately keeping 
the Arab population in “a state of illiteracy and ignorance.” The education 
service faced continuous budget reductions due to “increased expenditure 
on public security” (ibid: 160, 162)
The neglect of girls’ education was attributed, by the British 
administration, to “religious and social barriers” and to the lack of interest 
of the local community. An official document published in 1946 stated 
“there has not yet been a universal demand for the education of girls 
in Muslim villages, although the demand is increasing” (ibid: 229). But 
neither ‘religious’ nor ‘social’ considerations were real obstacles, during 
the last decade of the Mandate at any rate. In the towns, where seclusion 
of women was widely practised, there were two girls for every three boys 
attending school, while in villages, where no seclusion was practised, there 
was only one girl for every eleven boys attending school. “The paucity of 
girls’ schools”, says an Arab member of the Department, writing in 1950, 
“was not due to any lack of desire on the part of parents to educate their 
daughters, but to the insufficiency of Government financial provision for 
education” (ibid: 229). Public education had no scheme for the training 
of women rural teachers before 1935, when a single training centre was 
opened, at a time when women teachers, trained or untrained, were 
almost impossible to find among the Muslim community, and very few 
could be found among the Christian communities with sufficient general 
knowledge and experience (ibid: 24-5). 
The town school syllabus was designed for boys’ as well as for 
girls’ schools, whereas the village syllabus was initially for boys’ schools 
only until the number of girls’ schools in villages was increased. Slight 
variations in the village schools’ syllabus allowed for the teaching of 
sewing and embroidery instead of manual work and agriculture to equip 
them to ‘develop’ their environment (ibid: 82). Learning English, one of 
the main skills needed to secure a job in the British Administration, was 
almost an exclusive ‘privilege’ for urban students. ‘Christian values’ were 
taught to girls in both urban and rural schools.5. Formal courses were 
equally alienating, and Arab nationalists have pointed out that while the 
syllabus contained features of the geography and history of the Arab 
countries, it insisted in its content and tone on the international rather 
than the national character of Palestine (ibid: 89).
Rural schools were under greater financial pressure than urban schools. 
| Re-Reading the Mandate: Palestinian Women and the Double Jeopardy of  Colonialism
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The British Administration required poor villages to bear up to half of 
the total capital cost of school-buildings and equipment, whereas more 
prosperous towns were not usually required to make such contributions 
until the last years of the Mandate (ibid: 173). If the quality and extent of 
education marked the boundaries between rural and urban students, the 
content and the language of the curriculum led to the widening of class 
cleavages, especially among women. It is pertinent and puzzling to note 
that while men transcended class boundaries in their political national 
organisations to some extent, women were more confined to ‘their’ class 
in their more local organisations. The policy and content of education 
provided to female students, might provide clues to this puzzle.
The British Mandate, as the Israeli occupiers did later on, raised the 
banner of advancing women’s education, reflected in the early creation 
of a section for female education by the British military administration 
in 1918. With passing years, however, female education remained one of 
the major lacunae in the Mandate policies: as it was not compulsory it had 
a limited effect on women’s situation. The British education system was 
highly centralised with all decision-making concentrated in the hands of 
British directors and assistants (ibid: 34). In contrast, men’s education 
was later Arabised. The principal and staff of the Men’s Training College 
were all Arabs (except for the lecturer in English). At the Women’s 
Training College, however the principal, vice-principal and three lecturers 
were British and the rest of the staff Palestinian (ibid: 50). Palestinian 
Government secondary schools and teacher training colleges for girls were 
governed by British standards and conducted in English.
Foreign schools provided another source of education. There were 
Christian schools run mainly by European Christian bodies in the country. 
This led to the establishment of various foreign Christian schools or rather 
“various foreign school systems” (ibid: 60). Despite their service to the 
country, all foreign schools during the Mandate period came to be viewed 
with mixed feelings by Arab nationalists, Christians no less than Muslims. 
While they were generally considered to have rendered a valuable service 
to the country by providing places for practically every Christian child 
of school age not in a state school, they tended in this way to “deepen, 
not to bridge, the educational gap between the two sections of the Arab 
community” (ibid: 64). Most foreign schools were concentrated in or 
around the towns, easily accessible to the children of Christian Arabs who 
were on the whole urban. On the other hand, more than two-thirds of the 
Muslim Arabs lived in villages, many of which were without state schools 
and far from most foreign schools. The comparatively small number of 
Muslim Arab children who attended foreign schools were either the 
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very rich who could pay fees or the very poor who were admitted on 
compassionate grounds or on grounds of exceptional merit. The disparity 
between the rates of literacy among the Muslim Arabs and the Christian 
Arabs must always be evaluated against this background (ibid: 64).
The impact of education on people’s identity was reflected in the 
words of one of my interviewees as follows: 
In our school (St. Joseph a French Catholic school, Jaffa), 
we used to learn everything about France, geography, population, 
weather, fashion even street names. We were not allowed to speak 
in Arabic during breaks, we could be fined if the teachers heard 
us speaking in Arabic. It was only during the revolt of 1936 that 
I realised that I belong to the same people who were revolting 
against the British, I realised that I am one of them, an Arab (Im 
Salim, Interview)
Khartabil, one of the leaders of the women’s movement and the head 
of the Tulkarem Arab Women’s Union recalls her education: “I went to 
the American school in Beirut in which the majority of courses were in 
English, that is why we were less interested in Arabic or Islamic cultures. 
When my father realised this lacuna, he asked a sheikh to teach us Arabic 
and the Quran twice a week” (Khartabil 1995:39). 
Class background and a foreign education helped to bring together 
middle-class women from different regions and different religions. As 
one women activist recalls, “we were all the same. We were educated and 
never felt any difference…We used to live together in boarding schools 
and …[were] members of the same associations…we used to love each 
other” (Sa’ida Jarallah cited in Fleischmann 2003:144). This class unity was 
exclusive; it did not and could not include rural women. Rural women were 
different in all aspects of their daily reality; they went, if they could at all, 
to different schools, followed different courses, spoke a different language, 
lived in different houses and dressed differently. These differences were 
reflected in the inability of elite women at that time to play the role 
played by the male nationalist movement (Zu’aytir 1980; Kimmerling 
and Migdal 1993). The role played by young male schoolteachers was 
crucial in mobilising and organising masses of peasants for the national 
struggle. This was a role that the few young women teachers could not 
play due to the social segregation and domestication of urban women, 
class distinctions and the difficulty of living in rural areas. Female teachers 
were fewer, less motivated and were not encouraged by the British policies 
to reach out to rural women. The male world of patronage and politics 
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created vertical lines of clientship extending into the rural hinterland. This 
was not the case with women’s groups and networks. However, the gains 
achieved for few middle class women under the British Mandate later did 
not survive the foundation of the Jewish State, which led to the uprooting 
and dislocation of the Palestinian society in all its social strata.
The Trouble with Nationalism(s)
Palestinian nationalism projected a contradictory image of Palestinian 
women and their movement during the Mandate. On one hand women 
were seen as the ‘modernisers’ and civilising agents of the long awaited 
independent nation. This enabled the women’s movement to develop and 
become visible. On the other hand, women were also seen as the emblems 
of their nation’s ‘authenticity’ and of historic social patterns. In this role, 
women were confined to ‘private’ space, the wards of their male relatives. 
Due to what Chatterjee calls the “inherent contradictoriness” in nationalist 
thinking (Chatterjee 1993: 38), ‘modernity’ claims to ‘advance’ and 
‘progress’ the nation while at the same time preserving its distinctiveness 
and particular traditions. 
These troubled links between women and their national movements 
were comparable to experiences in other third world countries in which 
nationalist vanguards were acting as the ‘modernisers’ of their nation and 
their women. As Jayawardena noted in her analysis of women’s roles in 
nationalist movements throughout the third world, “the status of women 
in society was the popular barometer of ‘civilization’” (Jayawardena 
1986: 8). Education, freedom of movement and monogamy became 
hallmarks of ‘civilised’ modernity. British, Arab and Zionist leaders all 
gave their attention to the process of ‘modernising’ women as a measure 
of the legitimacy of their power in Palestine (Katz 1996: 93; Katz 2003; 
Fleischmann 2003; Chatterjee 1993). 
I would propose an alternative model of investigating the histories of 
the struggles of different social groups Nationalist projects often articulate 
different interests, for political autonomy, from economic oppression. As 
such, national projects vary from one group to the other. This was the case 
in the Palestinian Mandate where the interests of the leading national elite, 
men and women, differed from those of peasants in many ways. The first 
tended to be conciliatory towards the colonial power, while the latter saw 
in the presence of this power their utter demise and destruction.
Dominant accounts generally define the fellahin (peasants) as 
“traditional, backward, and conservative”, as “activated by tribal and 
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religious loyalties” (Budeiri 1979: 46-47), and as “too isolated, ignorant 
and poor” to play a significant role in the national movement (Lesch 1979: 
17). In the same vein, rural women were portrayed as victims of ignorance 
and poverty and the object of middle class women charity (Mogannam 
1937; Khartabil 1995; Husseini-Shahid 2000). These views consider 
peasants, and consequently their women, as incapable of political initiative 
or collective action. Swedenburg showed that while subordinate to the rule 
of the notables, the peasantry nonetheless possessed a long tradition of 
opposition to their hegemony, as reflected in the great revolt of 1936-1939 
(Swedenburg 1995: 170). As Gramsci notes, a dominant class’s hegemony 
is never “total or exclusive”; it is, rather, a process, a relation of dominance 
that has “continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified” 
(Williams 1977: 112-3). 
Thus, instead of ascribing particular developments to ‘tradition’ 
or ‘Islam’, I shall seek to understand the ways specific cultural and 
religious currents influenced the behaviour of particular groups in 
particular circumstances, and how the social and political settings in which 
movements occurred helped shape the choice of strategies and thus the 
outcomes as well. By situating the movements discussed in this chapter in 
a broad context, it is possible to see more clearly the connections between 
changes within groups and those affecting society, the economy and the 
ruling power (whether colonial or national). 
Nationalism and Women’s Activism under the British Mandate 
(1918-1948)
This section focuses on the relationship between national liberation 
and women’s emancipation during the successive waves of national 
struggle. Palestinian national movements, whether during the British 
Mandate or in their reinvigoration in the mid-sixties, are evaluated by 
many feminists scholars as, at best, unable to articulate a coherent vision or 
platform on gender (Sayigh 1988; Peteet 1991; Jad 1991), and at worst, as 
conservative, traditional and chauvinist (Massad 1995; Parker 1999; Budeiri 
1995; Rubenberg 2001). I argue here that while the successive Palestinian 
national movements were unable to articulate a coherent platform on 
gender, their fragmented gender views came about as a reaction to women’s 
activism. Women’s activism, in turn, was, to a great extent, the product of 
the national movement and its various factions. 
The link between nationalist and gender discourses has been analysed 
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in different historical and cultural contexts Kandiyoti (1991a) argues, for 
example, that the integration of women into modern ‘nationhood’ follows 
a different trajectory from that of men. For instance, the protection of 
women’s ‘sexuality’ constitutes a “crucial distinction between the nation 
and its ‘others’” (1991a: 430). Common to the various analyses is the 
centrality given to the role of women in nationalist projects. Anthias 
and Yuval-Davis identify five major ways in which women have tended 
to participate in ethnic and national processes and in relation to state 
practices; as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities; as 
reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups; as participating 
centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as 
transmitters of its culture; as symbols in the ideological discourses used 
in ethnic/national differences; and as participants in national, economic, 
political and military struggles (1989: 7). 
It is important to bear in mind that there is no unitary category of 
women that can be unproblematically conceived as the focus of ethnic, 
national or state policies and discourses. In the Middle East, nationalist 
and liberationist movements animated women as actors and as symbols 
(Badran 1995; Afkhami and Friedle 1997). Women constitute the nation’s 
actual symbolic figuration (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989: 10), while 
distinctions between ethnic groups or nations are constituted centrally by 
the sexual behaviour of women.6 
During the Mandate, the Palestinian national movement ascribed a 
new role to urban elite women as the companions of men to save the nation 
(Mogannam 1937; Fleischmann 2003). But this new role was contested 
by peasant men, and women for that matter, who sought to affirm their 
power through their involvement in the struggle for national liberation. 
This contestation was not related, I argue, to peasant ‘traditionalism’, but 
rather was a reflection of class antagonism directed against the cultural 
hegemony of the urban elite including their women; it was a way to assert 
their newly empowered peasant identity through their collective act in the 
Great Revolt. The main strategy of the national elite (male and female) 
was to hold the colonisers accountable to their own value system and 
to their discourse as ‘modernisers’ promising emancipation (Chatterjee 
1993). This recourse to the path of persuading the British Mandate of the 
legitimacy of the Palestinian aspirations was largely ignored while villages 
and peasants were getting increasingly impoverished. The more assertive, 
violent resistance was not a strategy developed or planned by the urban 
elite, as they were not the ones to bear the brunt of the British oppression. 
The collective act of resistance gave peasants more power as a group 
distinct from the urban elite.  
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The tradition of women’s activism was, like the male elite’s, more 
pacific. Women in Palestine, as in other countries, began this tradition 
by establishing charitable organisations in urban centres (Badran 1995; 
Baron 1994; Chatty and Rabo 1997; Joseph 1997). Women leaders were 
drawn from “bourgeois and rich families as well as female relatives of 
civil servants” in cities like Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa (Khartabil 1995: 57). 
They were mainly Christians empowered by the emergence of missionary 
education (Al-Tibawi 1956; Husseini-Shahid 2000; Mogannam 1937; 
Muslih 1988) and focused on the education of girls and the relief of the 
poor and sick (Khartabil 1995; Jammal 1985). From its charitable origins, 
the Palestinian women’s movements was shaped to a great extent by the 
deterioration of the political situation prompted by British colonial policies 
and the brutality of the British Mandate in suppressing the Palestinian 
revolts, the rise of the Palestinian resistance to the Zionist project and 
the consolidation of the Palestinian national movement in the twenties 
and the thirties. These events pushed women to try to transcend religious 
boundaries7. Differences between Christians and Muslims, rural and 
urban, however, hindered the realisation that patriarchy was the common 
unifying enemy to struggle against (Alexandra Aboud in Fleischmann 
2003: 274)8. 
The prevailing national turmoil also led women’s organisations to 
widen the scope of their programmes and develop their organisations. The 
establishment of the Arab Women’s Association in 1930 was an important 
step in pooling women’s activism. However, it failed to create a national 
coalition or a national women’s organisation (Mogannam 1937; Jad 1990; 
Peteet 1991; Fleischmann 2003). Nor could the loose coalition of women’s 
charitable organisations act as a unifying national force. As is the case of 
women’s NGOs nowadays, each women’s charitable organisation had 
its different by-laws and objectives. These de-centralised organisations 
met in response to the deteriorating political situation or in support of 
men’s delegations that were negotiating with the British Government 
(Mogannam 1937; Khartabil 1995). In times of crisis, the social work of 
providing charity was politicised when women were asked by the rebels 
during the Great Revolt of 36-39 to distribute food and medicine for the 
besieged villages (Khartabil 1995: 76). But it was not until 1944 that that 
these women’s activists formed the Arab Women’s Union, in a fledgling 
attempt to unifying their ranks on a national level. 
The ability to run or head a woman’s organisation was largely 
determined by a woman’s class background and her exposure to Western 
education (Mogannam 1937; Khartabil 1995; Zu’aytir 1980).9 A wide 
cultural gap separated women peasants from the urban national elite10. This 
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was mainly due to the lack of universal education for women combined 
with the inability of women to use the press or printed media (Mogannam 
1937) or move freely in public space. Female peasants did not suffer the 
same restrictions (Tucker 1993).
The continuously evolving cultural construction of national identity 
(Schlesinger 1987: 261) helps explain the backlash against elite women 
during the Great Revolt 1936-39. Thus, one can see the recourse to 
tradition, in this case imposing the veil on mainly urban women11, not as 
‘traditionalism’ but rather as a ‘new’ peasant invention to assert their own 
power, not least since they did not impose the same on their own women12. 
In this crisis, elite women were abandoned by their male national leaders 
and were called upon to dress modestly like their “sisters, the warriors 
of the villages” (Swedenburg 1995: 181). This led to the withdrawal of 
the female elite from public space to focus their efforts on ‘social and 
development issues’ rather than on demonstrations and anti-government 
denunciations (Flieschmann 2003: 178). This decline in women’s political 
activism could also be attributed to fact that urban elites and their families 
fled the national turmoil during the Great Revolt (Husseini-Shahid 2000: 
68,113,117,123). The pretensions of the nationalist male elite to modernity 
faltered when confronted by the militancy of the rebellious peasantry, 
leaving their women in a precarious position. In response to the peasants’ 
claim that elite women were ‘less authentic’, nationalist men politicised the 
meaning of women’s domesticity, elevated it to new heights, and imbued it 
with nationalist significance (Fleischmann 2003:10; Chatterjee 1990: 238-
40, 248). 
The dilemma of Palestinian women of how to combine the national 
and feminist struggle is one of the markers of the women’s movement 
from its inception to today. The words of Khartabil at the Cairo13 Arab 
Women Conference in 194414 are significant in clarifying the difference 
between the struggle of women still fighting for the recognition of their 
nation and their existence and “other women who live in a secure nation 
and a state” (Khartabil 1995: 91). The deterioration of the political 
situation in Palestine was forcing both men and women to change course. 
Men realised their need for women’s activism and organisation in general, 
which brought them back to the public space this time with the support 
and under the protection of the male led national movement. 
The women’s movement under the British Mandate was not born 
out of a feminist impulse to articulate women’s rights per se, but rather 
out of women’s experience within the national movement. Their speech 
was subtle and indirect, since there was no authority to which claims 
could be directed especially when the nation itself was under threat. The 
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reason why the middle classes united with the peasant fighters was that 
they could share a common sense of threat. This costly lesson would be 
re-experienced throughout the different phases of the Palestinian women’s 
movement. In other words, there were successive phases of rapprochement 
in times of crisis between the professional middle classes and the popular 
masses and a distancing and divergence of agendas at periods where it 
looked like a process of state consolidation may be underway. This pattern 
may be traced throughout the different phases of the Palestinian women’s 
movement after the nakba of 1948. 
Endnotes
1 The ‘woman question’ denotes the place of women and gender in the national projects of 
third world nationalist elites (see Kandiyoti 1991).
2 Interviews with Marie Tamari (Im Salim), Mofteya Hamad (Im Raafat), Aziza el-Haj-
Amin (Im El-‘Abed) and Samiha Darwish (Im Mazen).
3 According to Joan Scott in her path-breaking book Gender and the Politics of History 
(1988), the concept of gender meaning the social construction of relations between the 
sexes, is an equivalent of class, race, ethnicity, and other categories of historical analysis. 
Because gender has not yet attained the conceptual definition of other analytical categories 
like class, which has been developed since the nineteenth century, using gender as a tool 
of analysis of mandatory politics shares with these other studies a spirit of experiment 
and exploration. Thompson used it in her analysis of the French Mandate in Syria and 
Lebanon (Thompson 2000:4), and I will try to follow her steps on the British Mandate on 
Palestine.
4A Survey of Palestine 1991: 635.
5 It was particularly striking to note that most of rural schools, mostly Muslim, were 
teaching female students the to make an embroidery of St. George (England’s patron saint) 
killing the dragon with his long spear. To this day, it is common to see the embroidery of 
this and other Christian Saints hanging on the walls of peasants’ houses.
6 Several writers looking at different regions point to the ways in which dress and sexual 
behaviour take on increasingly symbolic value in the struggle over cultural and national 
identity. Whether Sikh or Cypriot (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989), Bangladeshi (Kabeer 
1989), Iranian or Afghani women(Moghadam 1992) women should all behave in sexually 
appropriate ways. If they do not, then neither they nor their children may be considered 
part of the community
7 Mogannam states that this was not the first time that a women’s society with mixed 
membership was established in the Holy City. She states that as early as 1919 an Arab 
ladies’ association was formed for similar purposes. Madame Faiz Bey Haddad, one of the 
leading promoters and organisers of this society, was delegated to convey to King Feisal in 
Damascus in 1919 the congratulations of the Arab women of Jerusalem on his accession 
to the throne, and to seek his assistance in aid of the society (Mogannam 1937:56). But 
one could add that the stress on mixed membership could be attributed, not to religious 
tolerance but rather to a need to enhance national interests. 
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8 One might argue also that this difference in religious identity inhibits a unifying women’s 
movement from taking a critical stand vis-à-vis prevailing religious conservatism. Christian 
women were more represented in the leadership of the women’s movement than in the 
population (respectively 25 to 11). This over-representation might not be helpful in 
confronting a social order set by the Muslim majority. It is interesting to note the different 
meanings behind the targeting of women in the thirties compared to the nineties. In the 
first case men wanted women to show more Palestinianism while in the latter they were 
targeted, in the course of the first intifada, to show more ‘Islamism’.
9 The name of ‘Maimana Al-Qassam’ the popular leader in Haifa slums and the daughter 
of the Sheikh Izzedin al Qassem, figured only once in the 1938 Women of the East 
Conference under the auspices of Huda Sha’rawi. Having a very famous, well respected 
father was not enough to advance her in the women’s organisations without a suitable 
class background. In Khartabil’s book she mentioned how Maimana moved to Tulkarem 
from Haifa after the death of her father and her name was mentioned as a member of the 
Tulkarem charitable association. Khartabil reveals how she, while a newcomer to the city, 
was asked by a group of women, who were disputing over the presidency of the Tulkarem 
women’s association, to be the president. Khartabil of course had all the criteria to be 
a head of women’s organisation at that time, meaning high class background, high level 
of education and a famous husband working as a senior doctor in the British Mandate 
government (Khartabil 1995:70-1).
10 In Serene Husseini’s memories she mentions her summer vacation in a nearby village, 
“the long summer days passed quickly (…) our families grew closer together, exchanging 
customs and habits. We learned village cooking and they learned city ways, and our lives 
were enriched” (Husseini-Shahid, 2000:32). The a’yan benefited from the great increase in 
imports which changed the mode of life for the Palestinian upper class and their mode of 
consumption (fancy cars, luxurious receptions, extravagant weddings, mode of dress and 
entertainment). As described by one of the richest Christian families at that time:
We used to travel to Lebanon to spend the summer and weekly we used to 
organise receptions in turn in each one of the high families constituting our 
community. In these receptions, women used to display the best they have, 
dressed in the latest fashion, they distribute invitation cards to the invited 
families stating the date and the place of the coming reception. The reception 
starts at early Sundays noon, by offering fresh juices, light snacks, meals, fruits, 
desserts all made by women who were competing in regard of organisation, 
cleanliness, cleverness, elegance and high manners. We used to speak in French 
and invite Muslim well known families (Im Salim, Interview).
11 According to Zu’aytir, one of the local leaders disseminated a statement asking all men 
in cities to wear the peasants’ koffeya instead of the tarboush. This is not the same thing as 
asking urban women to veil as for men the demand was tactical, to protect peasants when 
present in cities since they were mainly targeted by the British police (Zua’ytir 1980: 440).
12 In the chant of the popular poet and ‘zajal’ popular singer, Nuh Ibrahim: “And you, the 
Arab woman march into step with your sisters the warriors (Mujahidat) of the villages. 
Stop using your make-up, stop going to the cinema and other kinds of entertainment. Rise 
to the level of your sisters who carry water jugs on their heads, joining the warriors, singing 
and cheering them and so easing their death” (Swedenberg 1995:182). The mockery and 
contempt of ‘Westernised’ women was reflected in children’s songs which some young 
boys used to recite when seeing a woman with a hat ‘umm al-burnita al-raqqasa biddha 
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bumba we rasasa (the woman who wears a hat, the dancer, deserves a bomb and a bullet) 
(Sayigh 1987:28). 
13 The first conference convened by Sha’rawi in 1938 to support the Palestinian cause was 
given the name of ‘mutamar ni’ssa al sharq’ Conference of Women of the East (Zu’aytir 
1980:471). Sha’rawi resisted the attempts by some Palestinian intellectuals to call it the 
Arab women’s conference, since pan-Arabism was not developed yet as in Lebanon and 
Syria at that time. 
14 Khartabil attributes the convening of the 1944 conference and the creation of the Arab 
Women’s Union to the demand of the Palestinian women who sent representatives to 
delegate to Huda Sha’rawi the authority to represent and to defend the rights of the 
Palestinian people in all international arenas. 
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THE OTHER WALL
Banned marriages and fragmented 
citizenships in Israel and Palestine
Édouard Conte
This is a shortened and translated version of an article by 
Édouard Conte, co-director of the Institute for Social Anthropology 
at the University of Bern and long-time member of the Laboratory 
of Social Anthropology at the Collège de France in Paris. Professor 
Conte gave a talk based on this study at a roundtable discussion at 
Birzeit University on 10 March 2005, sponsored by the Ibrahim 
Abu Lughod Institute of International Studies. The Review 
thanks Professor Conte for permission to publish this important 
investigation, and Rania Abdallah for translating it from the 
original French. The full article in French can be found in the special 
issue of the journal Études rurales (173-174) entitled ‘Palestine’, 
just published by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales 
in Paris. This volume is the fruit of a three-year cooperation project 
with Birzeit University linking Palestinian, French and Austrian 
scholars and supported by the French National Centre for Scientific 
Research (CNRS).
Conte explores how Israel’s new legal barriers to marriage 
across the Green Line constitute the “other wall”, with consequences 
as profound as the physical barrier of the apartheid wall on the rights 
of Palestinians to marry and raise families. In so doing, he draws on 
the important work of local human rights organizations, including 
Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, and 
B’tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories. The Review recommends Adalah’s website 
(www.adalah.org) to its readers who wish more information, 
including the full text of the laws, as well as continued updates.
“… one cannot effect change if one misdiagnoses reality 
(and) it is not necessary for the worst of all to happen for 
opposition to what is happening to be justified.”
Amira Hass, Ha’Aretz, 9 July 2003
layout-V3E.indd   30 09/11/1426, 05:32:42 ã
31Review of  Women Studies |
Under the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) 
of 31 July 2003, the Knesset prohibits Palestinians from the Occupied 
Territories (East Jerusalem excluded) who marry an Israeli or a permanent 
resident of Israel to establish residence in Israel (or in East Jerusalem) or 
to acquire Israeli citizenship. This temporary order clearly restricts the 
matrimonial freedom of Israeli citizens or permanent residents of Arab 
origin. The Sharon government prepared to adopt this bill by a vote of 
confidence, but it was approved, upon first reading in the Knesset, by 53 
votes to 23, with 1 abstention, for a period of one year. This vote made a 
temporary law out of a “suspension order” (Government Decision 1813) 
in the same vein, issued by a unanimous Cabinet resolution on 12 May 
2002, which, in turn, ratified a previously well-established administrative 
practice. The order was renewed without amendment on 21 July 2004, for 
a period of six months, and then again on 27 January 2005 for a period 
of four months only, no doubt because of the reservations voiced by the 
new Labour members of the Sharon Cabinet and the judicial authorities. 
[On 27 July 2005, the Knesset voted to extend the order until 31 March 
2006, with minor amendments which, as Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab 
Minority Rights in Israel, observed “do not diminish the unconstitutionality 
or discriminatory nature of the Law and, in the case of some amendments, 
inflict further violations of constitutional rights.” (Adalah 2005) – Eds.]
As a result of this measure, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship or 
residency, including and especially those living in East Jerusalem, who 
choose to marry someone residing in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, 
must move to the Occupied Territories (not including East Jerusalem) in 
order to live with their chosen spouse. Otherwise, they are forced to live 
separately or to abandon their matrimonial plans. Furthermore, children 
resulting from such marriages are denied the right to hold permanent 
residence in Israel and, of course, the right to hold Israeli citizenship. They 
may be compelled to leave the country (Israel proper) as of the age of 
12. Nevertheless, any other person who is not a resident of the Occupied 
Territories, including Arabs of third countries (though only in theory, as 
we shall see), who marries an Israeli citizen continues to be entitled to 
Israeli nationality or to permanent resident status.
Stakes of the law
By this contribution, I wish to situate this “temporary” order within 
the complex series of administrative measures which, since 1993, aim to 
restrict matrimonial relations between Palestinians residing in Israel (with 
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citizenship or residency) and Palestinians from the Occupied Territories 
by limiting trans-border – i.e., across the Green Line – family unification. 
Consequently, I will seek to point out the implications, whether political 
or sociological, of the new disposition, based on the debate, objections and 
recourses it has generated. It is important to show how the law of 31 July 
2003 endorses and formalizes an already existing bureaucratic, civil and 
military practice and questions certain aspects of the Law on Nationality 
and Entry into Israel of 1952 whilst compromising, in advance, the 
integrity of individual rights that would otherwise be guaranteed by the 
citizenship of a future Palestinian state.
In an attempt to justify a statute that patently infringes the 
fundamental rights of the Arab populations under its administration 
or control (cf. Amnesty International 2003, CERD 2004), the State of 
Israel has put forward arguments that were sometimes security-related 
and sometimes demographic. The main and official justification is that 
trans-border family unification, which has evolved into a wide-scale 
practice since the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, 
makes it easier for terrorists to plan and execute attacks in Israel, and thus 
constitutes a potential or proven threat to the security of the State of Israel. 
However, the debate conducted, whether within the Israeli parliamentary 
commission in charge of following up on this legislation or in the press, 
asserts, perhaps with less dissimulation, the necessity to counter the long-
term demographic consequences posed by the permanence of an intricate 
and adaptable web of matrimonial ties, linking Palestinians from all over 
the world, which is sociologically centred on the Jewish state. That is 
because this network of alliances is constantly renewed and transcends all 
borders and barriers, be they symbolic or material, erected by Israel. In 
this short essay, I will attempt to demonstrate that, when taken together, 
these two not-so-contradictory motivations reveal an elementary fear, 
both immediate and deferred, of the consequences engendered by the 
lack of social control over an adverse community who will remain both 
“from within” and “from without”, regardless of the political or military 
evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The Israeli Government’s Official Position
The Law of 31 July 2003 is retroactive, whereby it prohibits 
Israeli citizens or residents who have not submitted family unification 
applications before 12 May 2002, and who have married or are expecting 
to marry a resident of the Occupied Territories (not including East 
layout-V3E.indd   32 09/11/1426, 05:32:43 ã
33Review of  Women Studies |
Jerusalem), from legally residing in Israel (including and especially in 
annexed East Jerusalem) with their spouse. Children of these couples 
may not continue to live in East Jerusalem with their parents beyond the 
age of 12. Hence, this law not only separates spouses or fiancés but also 
the children of “bi-territorial” couples born in the Occupied Territories 
(excluding East Jerusalem). The order’s purview is not to determine 
whether a foreign national is allowed freely to enter and dwell in Israel but 
to determine if citizens born and residing in the state, but of Palestinian 
descent, are entitled to live with the spouse of their choice in their own 
country. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an attempt 
to explain the action of its government:
The State of Israel has allowed family reunification for 
years, granting legal status in Israel to foreign spouses of Israeli 
citizens and permanent residents. In the first phase, the spouse 
would be granted temporary resident status, and after a given 
period of time, he or she could be granted permanent resident 
status and, eventually, Israeli citizenship. […]
The ongoing armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians since 
September 2000 has led, inter alia, to the frequent commission of suicide 
bombings inside Israel. A growing involvement in this conflict has been 
noted on the part of Palestinians originally from the territories, who carry 
Israeli identity cards, given pursuant to procedures of family unification 
procedures with Israeli citizens or residents. In so doing, such Palestinians 
abuse their legal status in Israel, which allows them free movement 
between Palestinian Authority territories and Israel.
In order to prevent such potential danger, the Government decided 
in May 2002 to temporarily suspend the granting of legal status in Israel, 
including through family unification…” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, communiqué of 10 August 2003).
Avraham Poraz (Likud), Minister of Interior at the time, was more 
direct than his Foreign Affairs colleagues and “reassuring” in his own way. 
He said: “there is no intention at the moment of entering Arab villages [in 
Israel] to check every person and carry out mass expulsions. But we will 
not let them have identity cards.” (Poraz quoted by Lynfield, 2003).
We thus find a new category of people who have no legal residence 
and who, in fact, do not hold any of the citizenships recognized by 
international law. The present respite (Spring 2005) of violence in Israel-
Palestine may partially explain the hesitation, on the part of Israeli 
authorities, to extend the effects of the temporary order for a whole year 
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or to transform it into an “ordinary” statute. However, this might also be 
a delaying tactic, which slowly consolidates the effects of an exceptional 
law, without having to discuss the legitimacy thereof, i.e. its legality 
under Israeli law. The strategy would then be that of procrastination into 
oblivion; the tactic would be that of “bureaucratic normalization”; and one 
of the consequences: yet another dispossession of civilian authorities to 
the profit of the military authorities.
Extent of the Phenomenon
According to Yuri Shtern (National Union Party), Chairman of the 
Knesset Interior Committee, some 130,000 Palestinians from the West 
Bank and Gaza were granted Israeli citizenship or residence through 
family unification procedures since 1993. In order to acquire such status, 
applicants endured a four-and-half-year waiting period but the majority of 
applications, according to Shtern, were finally approved (Lynfield 2003). 
Other estimates of the number of applicants vary between 100,000 and 
140,000. In their testimony before the commission, Interior Ministry 
officials revised these figures; they asserted that only 22,414 family 
unification applications had been submitted, of which 16,007 were 
approved. However, they omitted to specify whether the first figure 
represented the number of applicants or that of heads of families having 
deposited multiple applications in the name their dependents. They also 
failed to say how many people were actually issued residence permits 
following the acceptance of their applications (Adalah [16 July] 2003). 
Authorities are thus maintaining a thick fog over the real extent of the 
phenomenon.
Moreover, it is very probable that the number of Palestinians living 
in Israel without authorization substantially exceeds that of those having 
obtained residence permits since 1993. Some estimate that more than 
200,000 “illegal aliens” will suffer the effects of the new law, although 
their presence in Israel may have been rendered irreversible (except in 
case of arrest or expulsion) by the construction of the “Security Barrier”. 
In principle, the “law-wall” dilemma only affects pending applications, 
currently estimated at 15,000. In practice, it concerns all the clandestine 
population who will, shortly, no longer be able to either enter or leave 
Israel or to request a regularisation of their situation; nor will they be able 
to marry freely. Whether voluntarily or not, this measure further affects 
the whole Palestinian population living in the “grey zone”, which stretches 
between the “Green Line” (corresponding to the borders of 1967) and the 
| The Other Wall
layout-V3E.indd   34 09/11/1426, 05:32:43 ã
35Review of  Women Studies |
new “separation barrier”. These individuals may not aspire to residence 
in Israel, nor may they apply for citizenship with the occupying power. 
Largely cut off from the Palestinian Authority’s administrative services, 
these individuals are often not in a position to register marriages, births 
and deaths… unless the soldier guarding the transit point allows them 
through for a few hours… before they go back home in the “grey zone”.
Administrative Precedents
Until 1991, freedom of movement prevailed between the Occupied 
Territories, including East Jerusalem, which was annexed in 1967, and 
Israel. Thus, Palestinian citizens of Israel or East Jerusalem residents were 
generally able to live with their spouses or children, who were native to 
the other former Palestine Mandate territories, without having to solicit 
separate residence permits for them. The concept of family unification 
became highly relevant to across-the-Green-Line marriages after February 
1991 [whereas previously most applicants for family unification were foreign-
passport holders – Eds.], when Israel compelled residents of the Occupied 
Territories, excluding East Jerusalem, to apply for residence permits. Over 
the two subsequent years, such permits were issued rather easily and for 
relatively long periods. Nevertheless, this is not the whole story, since 
sexual discrimination played an important part in discouraging “inter-
territorial” marriages through “citizenship suspension” measures:
In Israel the law on nationality continues to discriminate 
against approximately one thousand women of Palestinian 
origin-Israeli citizens who married Palestinians from the 
Occupied Territories between the years of 1967 and 1990. These 
women were required to sign a document giving up their Israeli 
nationality while married to and residing with Palestinian from 
the Occupied Territories. The women signed the documents 
without understanding the implications. Children of these 
women were therefore born stateless and without nationality. 
Divorcees or widows wishing to recover their Israeli nationality, 
to return to Israel or to gain permanent residency are often 
refused. They continue to live in Israel as refugees and face 
deportation if discovered. (UNDP 2004)1.
Starting in March 1993, this measure, which was not based on Israeli 
(or any other) law and which strikingly illustrates the power of bureaucrats, 
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became almost superfluous with the closure of the “Territories”. The newly 
set-up checkpoints system isolated Israel from the occupied regions while 
fragmenting the latter. It particularly cut East Jerusalem off from its West 
Bank hinterland (cf. B’Tselem 1998). Since then, rare permits have been 
issued, based on unclear, if not arbitrary, criteria. Until March 1994, the 
family unification process was characterized by gender asymmetry. The 
Interior Ministry only considered applications filed by male Jerusalem 
residents, according to the principle that “the [Arab] woman follows 
her husband” (Stein et al. 2004: 7). Consequently, a male resident of the 
other occupied territories could not join his wife in East Jerusalem. The 
Association for Civil Rights in Israel contested this inequity before the 
High Court of Justice and won. Since then, women were allowed to apply 
for family unification… if they had not been coerced into giving up their 
Israeli citizenship or into moving to the “Territories”.
Still in 1993, Israel instated an annual quota of 2,000 family unifications 
per year. In 1995, the civil and military administration extended the scope 
of this quota to include the “A Zones” of the self-rule territories, which 
are under the exclusive control of the Palestinian Authority and where 
the majority of the population lives (Amnesty International 2003). As of 
1996, the Interior Ministry began to require couples applying for family 
unification to submit a multitude of documents, the list of which varied 
from one civil servant to the other. They included attestations of residence 
in Jerusalem, property title deeds, lease contracts, payslips, phone bills, 
furniture inventories, third-party certificates, grade sheets, etc.
In June 1997, the Interior Ministry announced that it was no longer 
issuing any permits allowing non-resident spouses, whether male or 
female, to remain in Israel during the processing of the family unification 
application, thus instating bureaucratically a so-called ‘graduated 
procedure’ according to which the Palestinian spouse of an East Jerusalem 
inhabitant may not obtain his or her residence permit except at the end of 
a period of five years and three months as of the date of approval, by the 
Interior Ministry, of the family unification application. As for Palestinian 
spouses of Arab citizens of Israel, they had to wait for four years. During 
that period, the Palestinian spouse would be issued short-term residence 
permits and, over the successive renewals thereof, the authorities would 
make sure that the marital union was still legally valid. In other words, they 
made certain that it was not an unconsummated marriage or a polygamous 
relationship. For Jerusalem inhabitants, they would verify the effective 
residence within the city. Under these circumstances, some ten years were 
necessary for a Palestinian partner to obtain a permanent residence permit, 
that is if the application had initially received an approval in principle.
| The Other Wall
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In 1998 and 1999, the quota was maintained at 2,000 applications 
per year for a Palestinian population of around three million souls but, in 
2000, the quota was raised to 4,000. At the end of 2000, with the outbreak 
of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the procedure was purely and simply suspended 
(Amnesty International 2003). 
We should now take a closer look at the encroachment of bureaucratic 
process, through the example of a given family, in order better to 
understand the administrative machinery and the day-to-day implications 
for concerned individuals2. More particularly, the following story illustrates 
the room for manoeuvre and varying responses of civil servants and the 
police, when confronted with “illegal-alien” spouses:
Yasir is a construction worker in the family business. He lives in Bayt 
Safafa (West Jerusalem) and holds a permanent resident identity card. He 
marries Samahir who is native to the town of Yatta (West Bank), on 24 
June 1996. They are blessed with three children. Two months before his 
wedding, Yasir submitted a family unification application to the Interior 
Ministry in East Jerusalem in order to allow his wife legally to reside 
with him. He carefully prepared his dossier, which included “water bills, 
property tax [certificates], electricity and phone bills”, in addition to his 
marriage certificate. Please note that Yasir, his wife and their children live 
with Yasir’s parents, his brother and the latter’s family. Not one member 
of this household was ever suspected of activities that would present a 
direct or indirect risk to the security of the State of Israel.
In reply to his request, Yasir received an acknowledgement of receipt 
instructing him to present himself every six months to the Interior 
Ministry:
Over the first year and a half, I went to the Interior 
Ministry three times, and each time they told me that the request 
‘was still being processed’. Then, after eighteen months had 
passed, I received a letter from the Ministry notifying me that 
I had not submitted all the documents they needed to process 
the application, such as an affidavit from an attorney regarding 
my place of residence. I went to the Interior Ministry and gave 
them the additional documents they requested. The clerks told 
me they would send me a letter. I continued to check every six 
months until 2001.
Then, in August 2001, Yasir’s brother married a Jordanian woman, 
before marriages between Palestinian residents and citizens of Israel as 
well as of Arab countries were prohibited de facto by order of Ariel Sharon 
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to the Shin Bet (General Security Service) (cf. infra). Following Yasir’s 
example, he submitted a family unification application. During a visit to 
the Interior Ministry, he was informed that his request had been approved. 
Taking advantage of his presence there, he enquired about Yasir’s 
application. He was told that it had been rejected. After asking to see the 
director of the office, the brother expressed his incomprehension, all the 
while asserting that both he and his brother lived in the same house, with 
their parents. The director heard him out and promised to write…
Having received no notification, Yasir stayed away from the Ministry 
out of fear of receiving a clear rejection notice. He decided to hire an 
attorney who filed for an appeal… against a decision that was never 
formally conveyed. In order to play it safe, Yasir enquired about his 
application every six months by phone and, contrary to what his brother 
was told, he was informed that no decision had been taken yet. Then, 
following an appeal filed in June 2002, he was informed that, in view of the 
suspension order (that preceded the temporary order of 2003), all family 
unification applications were frozen for an indefinite period. Six months 
later, he re-contacted the Ministry to enquire about the outcome of the 
appeal filed by his attorney. His correspondent told him that his initial 
request had been rejected and that no appeal had been received.
Having reached the end of the rope, he sought the assistance of 
HaMoked, an Israeli human rights defence organization. The latter’s 
staff pursued contacts with the Ministry on his behalf. But, at this stage, 
the inevitable took place. Once every two months, Samahir visits her 
parents in the West Bank, and – surprisingly enough – she regularly was 
fortunate enough not have her identity card checked at any fixed or flying 
checkpoints. However, in July 2002, she ventured outside Bayt Safafa with 
Yasir’s mother and brother in order to do some shopping for a birthday 
party. On the way back, they were stopped by the border police. One 
of the officers asked Samahir for her papers, so, not having an identity 
card to show, she handed him a copy of the “pending” family unification 
application. The officer asked her to get out of the car. She tried to explain 
her situation but he wouldn’t listen.
Alerted by his brother, Yasir joined them at the checkpoint. He 
explained to the border patrolman that Samahir needed to be residing in 
Jerusalem because the Ministry required, in order to approve the family 
unification application, that she live with her husband who, as a permanent 
resident, could not move to the Palestinian Territories because he would 
risk losing his Jerusalem resident status. The border guard retorted that she 
had no residence permit and must therefore be deported. End of discussion. 
Yasir continued to insist on further police investigation. The border guard, 
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who had become really agitated and been joined in the meantime by several 
colleagues, finally accepted to refer them to the police station but insisted 
on taking Samahir alone with him, in his Jeep. Yasir managed to convince 
the officer to allow him to drive her there in his own car.
Samahir walked into the police station with her baby in her arms, 
along with Yasir and his brother. She was finger-printed. The border 
guard yelled, before he left: “Tell the interrogator that I request that she 
be deported.”
Then, a police officer took down Samahir’s statement:
I translated what she said, and the officer wrote it down. 
I noted that the officer did not write what my wife said. For 
example, he asked her how she got to Tsur Baher, and she 
replied that she had been living in Jerusalem for seven years. The 
officer wrote that she had taken a dirt road to Tsur Baher from 
Bethlehem to go back and forth to visit her children. When he 
asked her to sign the statement, I asked to read it first to see 
what he had written. I [read it and then] said that she would not 
sign it in its current form.
As we were arguing, an interrogator came into the room. 
He heard what happened and demanded that the officer rewrite 
the statement. The officer took another statement from my wife, 
and then she signed it. Then we spoke with the interrogator and 
I told him what happened. He replied, ‘I recommend that she 
never leave the house,’ and told us to go home.
[…] Since that day when my wife was stopped, which 
was about a year ago, she almost never leaves home. We do not 
leave the neighbourhood. I take the kids out, while she stays 
imprisoned in Beit Safafa. Sometimes she wants to join us, but 
the older children do not allow her to come along. They tell her, 
‘Don’t come because the army will take you again.’
[…] My wife cannot return to Yatta, because the children 
and I have Israeli ID cards, and are not allowed to live with her.
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Neither in Israel nor in Palestine
In the 1999 Stamka case, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that 
any person who marries an Israeli citizen, including those of Arab origin, 
is entitled to equal treatment in the processing of his or her application 
for Israeli citizenship, provided that he or she has no prior criminal record 
and does not represent a security risk. By virtue of this ruling, in 2003, 
the Interior Ministry was supposed to have started granting citizenship 
to individuals who surpassed the maximum waiting period of four and 
a half years. Equity should also have been enacted concerning residence 
permit applications. It is within this context of tension between the 
supreme judicial authority and the government – and the outbreak of 
the second Intifada – that Government Decision No. 1813 (2002) was 
issued. Without consulting the Judiciary (and indeed, perhaps to avoid so 
doing), this provision gave an advance justification for the 2003 temporary 
order, stating that there is a need due to “implications of the processes of 
immigration and settlement in Israel of foreigners of Palestinian descent,” 
including by way of family unification. (Adalah, [16 July] 2003).
Three categories of individuals are directly – and retroactively 
– concerned by this order:
1. Newly married couples – The law prevents the Palestinian spouse 
from being granted residency or citizenship status in Israel. No new 
applications for naturalization will be accepted.
2. Prior applicants – Applications submitted before 12 May 2002 will 
be considered. However, no temporary or permanent residency or 
citizenship will be granted. Only permits for a temporary stay in 
Israel may be issued.
3. Individuals with temporary residency status – The law prohibits the 
upgrading of temporary residency status, granted prior to 12 May 
2002, to permanent residency or citizenship, even if the requests were 
authorized and the applicants met the necessary criteria. (Adalah [4 
August] 2003).
When questioned about whether, in fact, the order only concerned 
Arabs of Palestinian descent, the Interior Ministry spokesperson, Tova 
Elinson, declared, in August 2004, that authorities would distinguish 
between “those who live in the Palestinian Authority [sic] and those that 
are citizens of Arab countries” (Ettinger 2004). Elinson went on to say: 
“Every day, we receive numerous requests from Jordanians, Egyptians 
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and Syrians [brides of Druze from the Golan Heights]. The requests are 
accepted and dealt with” (ibid.). In a measure contradicting this official 
position, it should be noted that, when the new law was adopted, the 
Shin Bet, as mentioned earlier, received confidential instructions from 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to freeze the processing of all security files 
regarding citizens from Arab countries. In other words, the Interior 
Ministry receives the applications and the Shin Bet puts them on hold. As 
for the applicants, they simply do not receive any answers (ibid.). At the 
insistent request of the centre-left daily Ha’Aretz, which had uncovered 
the existence of such an order, the Ministry finally admitted that “indeed 
there exists an order of the prime minister according to which the 
suspension of family reunification will include citizens of Arab countries 
for the same security reason that the law suspending family reunification 
of residents of the Palestinian Authority was passed” (ibid.). It is possible 
that authorities particularly have in mind Jordanian, Lebanese or Syrian 
citizens of Palestinian origin, who make up another category of persons 
that is difficult to define and control, since they are theoretically protected 
by international law. The status of bi-national couples is rendered even 
more problematical by the fact that Egypt and Jordan, for example, do not 
favour marriages between their citizens and Palestinians citizens of Israel or 
residents of the Occupied Territory – unions which are nevertheless quite 
numerous – and do their best to slow down naturalization procedures.
Justifying the need for the order
The security argument
The present Israeli Minister of Public Security, Gideon Ezra (Likud), 
estimated that, since 1993, more than 100,000 Palestinians have acquired 
Israeli nationality through marriage. “This law, he added, comes to address 
a security issue. Since September 2000 [and the beginning of the second 
Intifada], we have seen a significant connection, in terror attacks, between 
Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli Arabs” (The Independent, 
1 August 2003). However, this assertion seems to be based more on 
unchecked speculations than on official reports. When questioned by the 
High Court of Justice, the Minister of Interior stated, in a declaration 
dated 16 December 2003, that:
Among the residents of the region who received legal status 
in Israel pursuant to marriage, some were involved in carrying 
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out attacks in Israel, both as attackers and in assisting attackers 
in infiltrating into Israel from the Territories. (cited in Stein et. 
al 2004: 13)
The precedent that immediately comes to mind is the Haifa 
restaurant bombing of March 2002, in which fourteen people were killed. 
The bomber, Shadi Tubasim, “had married an Israeli Arab, and, through 
the family reunification procedure, had become an Israeli citizen” (Nikfar 
2005: 5). Yet, when the High Court of Justice queried the government on 
its family unification policy eighteen months later, which elements were 
advanced to corroborate the supposition that “residents of the region” 
posed a collective security threat? The State asserted that “security services 
have information indicating that, since 2001, twenty-three residents of the 
region who received legal status in Israel through family unification were 
involved in providing meaningful assistance in hostile activity against state 
security” (Stein et al. 2004: 14)3. However, only six cases were evoked 
to demonstrate “the involvement of persons holding Israeli documents 
following family unification, in carrying out or assisting attacks” (ibid.).
The State did not specify how many attacks had been carried out or 
where they had occurred, nor did it prove the involvement of Palestinians 
enjoying legal status in Israel. More importantly, it is not said to what extent 
holding an Israeli identity card helped them commit their alleged acts. 
Furthermore, it has not been specified whether they have been brought to 
justice and sentenced. Finally, in none of the six cases of individuals who 
hold Israeli identity cards through family reunion does the state claim that 
they directly participated in the attacks (ibid.: 15).
The presumption of innocence of an entire population is thus 
questioned because, as alleged, the issuance of Israeli documents would 
entail “a security risk, in that the allegiance and commitment of the 
said person is liable to be to the state or political entity [Palestine] in 
conflict with Israel” (ibid.: 13). Therefore, implementing the temporary 
order becomes a “duty” for the State, even if it mocks the basic rights of a 
substantial category of Israeli citizens and is defined by criteria of ethnic and 
genealogical exclusion, applied across the board, without prior indications 
or proof. In order to justify what is, finally, nothing but a collective procès 
d›intention (a conviction based on speculation about supposed motives), 
the Ministry asserts that “the past does not teach anything about the 
future”. In other words, the peaceful conduct of the vast majority of 
Palestinians does not allow the state to forecast anything about what may 
later occur. In the present instance, how can one exclude drawing a parallel 
between the construction of the wall or, in given sections, the [electrified] 
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“separation fence”, a physical, “concrete” obstacle, and the construction of 
legal barriers on residence and citizenship, which impose a strict juridical 
obstacle on the normal conduct of social, marital and kinship relations? 
The two measures appear complementary because the temporary 2003 
order comes to bear precisely on those whom, had it not existed, would 
have been authorized to cross the new physical barrier. Let us illustrate this 
point through the following narrative:
In 1996, M., a university employee, resident of Ramallah and holder 
of an ID card issued by the Palestinian Authority, marries A., residing in 
East Jerusalem and holding a “blue” identity card, issued by the Israeli 
authorities, which authorizes its holder to live in Israel4. Each spouse is 
employed at his or her official place of residence. Their eldest daughter 
was born in 1998, in East Jerusalem. The family lives in East Jerusalem 
and the father commutes everyday through Ramallah to go work. Due to 
the restrictive measures instated in 2002, the couple requested the Interior 
Ministry’s authorization to rent a joint apartment in East Jerusalem. The 
request was swiftly rejected.
In view of this misfortune, the couple requested the “transfer” of their 
eldest daughter, who was first registered on her father’s Palestinian ID, to 
her mother’s “blue” ID, so as to facilitate future family unification in East 
Jerusalem. This second request was also quickly rejected on the grounds 
that a child who is already registered on a Palestinian ID document may not 
be registered again on an Israeli one, even if the second parent is recognized 
as a permanent resident of Jerusalem and thus, from the point of view of 
the authorities, a resident of Israel. Hence, ever since the implementation 
of the Law of 21 July 2003 began, discrimination has prevailed against 
Arab permanent residents of Israel in regard to the transmission of the 
right of residence in East Jerusalem to their offspring, born in Jerusalem, 
if their spouse is a resident of the Palestinian Territories.
In February 2005, after the birth of their second daughter, directly 
registered on her mother’s Israeli ID card, the couple filed a family 
unification application in East Jerusalem, where the father is not supposed 
to reside. This request could not be automatically rejected because both 
children were still under the age of 12.
Legally “pending”, the couple’s situation is henceforth jeopardized 
by another factor: an eight-meter-high concrete wall. In fact, their 
dwelling is located between the Qalandia checkpoint, through which now 
runs the section of the Wall separating the southern parts of Ramallah 
from the northern neighbourhood of East Jerusalem, and, within their 
neighbourhood, the al-Ram barrier. To further complicate matters, the 
family apartment is located in the vicinity of the Neve Ya’akov Israeli 
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urban settlement, in annexed Palestinian territory. In the future, the wall 
aims to “protect” this colony in a manner that would make it impossible 
for M. to commute through the passage point to Ramallah on a daily basis, 
hence leaving the family with the following choices: a) M. illegally remains 
within the perimeter of annexed Jerusalem: he would be able to live with 
his family but would lose his permanent job and run the risk of being 
arrested or deported to the West Bank; b) M. moves back to Ramallah 
alone, so as not to lose his job, on which his family depends greatly; c) the 
whole family moves to Ramallah: this would eliminate the risk of being 
arrested but would force A. to forfeit her job and, especially, her status and 
that of her daughters as permanent residents of East Jerusalem. Could it be 
that the new provision is meant precisely to generate such dilemmas?
If we hypothetically consider, from a certain point of view, that such 
measures are necessary and applicable, it remains to be proven that only 
Palestinians entering Israel through a family unification procedure pose 
a sharp security risk when none of them, with the exception of Shabi 
Tubasim, has, until today, been proved guilty of an act that constitutes a 
risk to Israel’s security. On the other hand, the law continues to authorize 
daily or temporary access to Palestinian labourers, even if their number has 
considerably dropped since the second Intifada. Why would these workers 
pose a lesser risk than family unification candidates?
We finally should bring to mind the only category of Palestinians to 
whom Israeli documents continue to be issued consistently: those who 
render “valuable services” to the Israeli cause, and who are called (by both 
sides) “collaborators”. What excludes that they might eventually, in order 
either to make amends for their wrongdoings, or to protect their kin who 
remained in the Palestinian Territories, engage in hostile actions against 
Israel?
Let us not forget, finally, that, with or without a ban on residency, 
children of an Israeli parent will continue to inherit the latter’s citizenship 
(ezrahut).
The security argument thus is polymorphous and incoherent, taking 
on many shapes and demonstrating little accord with the warnings 
expressed by Israeli official sources. Surely, on a symbolic level, it reflects 
a generalized fear, which is very real even if quite diffuse, in the face of 
what is perceived as a “continuous” Palestinian “infiltration”, driven by a 
social, rather than military, logic. This fear, however, can not justify such 
an order, which in any case may hardly be expected to sever, in the short 
term, the infinitely complex and versatile web of family ties: these uphold 
and reproduce the Palestinian social fabric over and beyond the physical 
and legal barriers erected by Israel since 1948.
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One might wonder if the representatives of the State, who are no doubt 
aware of this ambiguity, are themselves convinced of the effectiveness of 
this law. Let us note that the security argument, as summarized in the 
statement published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 August 2003, 
was only formulated ex post facto, in response to the cancellation order 
issued by the High Court of Justice, at the request of various individual 
rights defence associations (Adalah [11 November] 2003). The foundation 
of the matter lies elsewhere.
The demographic argument
Evoking demographic ratios between Arabs and Jews, Yitzhak Rabin, 
not long before his assassination, set the “red line not be crossed for Arabs 
[at] 20% of the [Israeli] population” (as quoted by Fargues 2000: 179), 
while Ben Gurion had fixed that limit at 15% (Kanaaneh 2002: 30). Rabin 
was reiterating the findings of the 1976 Koenig Report, underlining the 
political threat posed by the demographic progression of Israel’s Arab 
population: “Their growing numbers provide Arabs with a feeling of 
power and hope that time is working in their favour” (quoted by Fargues 
2000: 197). A quarter of a century later, in July 2001, the Knesset held 
a hearing on “the realization of the right of return by foreign Palestinian 
workers by means of advantageous marriages”. On that occasion, the 
Head of the Population Administration, Herzl Guedj, declared: “The 
problem [of family unification] is complicated and has demographic 
implications” (quoted in Stein et al. 2004: 17). More outspoken was his 
colleague, the then Interior Minister Eli Yishai, a member of the right-wing 
party Shas, who maintained the need to reduce the number of non-Jews 
obtaining Israeli citizenship because they “threaten the Jewish character 
of the State of Israel” (ibid.). Considering that 140,000 Palestinians had 
managed to obtain residency in Israel between 1993 and 2001 through 
family unification, Yishai declared that this figure “prove[s] that the right 
of return was being realized through the back door of the State of Israel” 
(ibid.: 18).
Whatever the actual number of people residing in Israel thanks to 
family unification, it is hard to imagine that this procedure has been 
systematically and collectively used by “the Palestinians” to alter, in the 
long term, the prevailing four to one ration of Jews and Muslims in the 
Israeli population. Still, it is true that some Palestinians resort, on an 
individual or family level, to fictitious or “planned” family unification, 
mainly in order to gain access to Israel’s labour market. This is sometimes 
done through either a fictive or polygamous marriage, or a convenient 
layout-V3E.indd   45 09/11/1426, 05:32:46 ã
46
divorce. To counter such schemes, the new law is supposed to hinder 
access to Israel for spouses in fictitious or polygynous union as well as 
for the children of the newly-resident spouse by a former marriage, or the 
latter’s relatives.
As of 1996-1997, the access of day-labourers to the Israeli job market 
was markedly reduced. Palestinian workers were branded as “dangerous 
at large” and were replaced by Romanians, Filipinos and other “low-cost” 
labourers. Confronted with this dilemma, many Palestinians tried to 
obtain a residence permit through marriage with a Palestinian resident 
in Israel. They sometimes resorted to a revocable divorce (talq raj‘) from 
the first wife. When the Israelis discovered the subterfuge, they started 
requiring that the divorce be final (talq b’n). “The workers [then] came 
up with a new strategy: obtain a final divorce, marry Palestinian women 
residing beyond the Green Line, obtain an Israeli residence permit, and 
then go back and remarry the first wife by virtue of a new contract and 
dowry (mahr)” (Shehada 2005: 159-162).
The notions of “family re-composition” vary considerably, as we may 
see, between Gaza and the Interior Ministry in Jerusalem. Palestinians 
trying to use family unification or matrimonial strategies in order to 
counter unemployment after long years of Intifada and closures may not, 
however, be conceived as foot-soldiers in a supposed “demographic war”, 
even if natality is not devoid of patriotic connotations (cf. Fargues 2000, 
chapters 7 and 8; Kanaaneh 2002).
However, these subtleties seem to elude those Israelis in favour of 
the Law of July 2003, the inspiration of which has been well summarized 
by Sean Gannon, on behalf of the Israel Hasbara5 Committee (2004). He 
wrote:
[..] the demographic question is the ultimate state security 
issue for Israel. The abiding ambition of the Palestinian Authority 
and its allies in the Arab world is the elimination of the Jewish 
national presence in what they see as Islamic lands. With military 
options exhausted, the emphasis is now achieving Israel’s 
destruction through a process of demographic dilution and 
democratic subversion, one which was facilitated by the ‘family 
reunification’ scheme. Many correctly viewed this undertaking 
as the covert implementation of the ‘right of return’.
Using this argument, former Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu 
proposed, during the Likud Congress of 2004 in Herzliya, a series of 
measures aimed at limiting Arab presence in Israel in view of foiling the 
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“demographic menace” (Shalhat 2004). Ha’Aretz journalist Antoine Shalhat 
retorts that it was precisely this restrictive policy, aimed at maintaining 
a strong Jewish majority, which contributes to the demographic trends 
witnessed within the Arab Israeli population by depriving the latter 
from the favourable conditions of a socioeconomic development that 
would no doubt lead to a progressive reduction of their natality. He 
shares this opinion with demographer Zvi Eisenbach who believes that 
“modernization will encourage a decrease in Moslem fecundity6.” (Quoted 
in Fargues 2000: 197, according to Portuguese 1998).
Israeli and Palestinian Citizenships
Azmi Bishara, Arab member of the Knesset (Balad), recalls the words 
of the founding father Ben Gurion, who insisted, in 1950, that the State 
cannot amend the Law of Return7 which guarantees to all Jews the right 
to Israeli nationality. Indeed, the latter is not created by the State; rather, 
it creates the State (2004: 2). The law stipulates that all Jews who settle in 
Israel, including those born there, are considered as having attained the 
country following an “ascent” (‘aliya), albeit purely symbolic, towards 
these lands. In the eyes of the Law of Return, Judaism and nationality are 
inextricably associated. Inversely, a Jew who converts to another religion 
does not remain “Jewish” (cf. High Court of Justice decision of 1958, 
in the Osborne case). “You are a Jew only if you are religiously a Jew. 
You become a Jew if you convert, and you stop being a Jew if you leave 
your faith”. One can certainly be an Israeli citizen without being Jewish 
(in a certain statistical measure), but does one then enjoy full rights of 
citizenship? Bishara has his doubts regarding that, in view of the prevailing 
“political theology of citizenship” (ibid.: 4-5).
If the law of 2003 is perpetuated, it might constitute an irreversible 
threshold in a long process of communtarization of Israeli citizenship. 
Beyond that point, ethnic origins and confessional affiliations will operate 
explicitly as legal determinants – and no longer “only” by implication 
or as markers in “usual” social conflicts – of a differentiated, unequal 
citizenship, issued by ascription upon birth and unchangeable by choice 
or fate. Consequently, restricting the right freely to reside with one’s 
spouse will not only apply to non-citizen Palestinians native to the 
Occupied Territories. It will fully fall upon Palestinian Arab citizens of 
Israel, who are the potential matrimonial partners of other Palestinians on 
both sides of the Green Line or the river Jordan. It will directly affect the 
children of “territorially mixed” couples, who will no longer be permitted 
layout-V3E.indd   47 09/11/1426, 05:32:46 ã
48
to cohabitate with both their mother and father, and will be banished to 
the country of one or the other parent. It will then become impossible to 
uphold the fiction of a single, uniform citizenship. From Israel’s point of 
view, this will stem from the institutionalisation of asymmetrical individual 
basic rights, and thus from an instituted social hierarchy among citizens. 
This will annihilate any pretension of equality in the eyes of the law. From 
the Palestinian point of view, this will mean that the territory of the former 
Palestine Mandate will be, even less than before, an homogenous space 
in terms of parenthood, matrimonial unions and filiation. From a double 
point of view, once the still-hypothetical State of Palestine is created, the 
question will arise as to whether or not dual-nationality is recognized for 
individuals born of bi-national unions.
In order better to understand the emergence of this non-egalitarian 
constellation, initiated by a “temporary” order and consolidated into law 
through successive ratifications, let us recall again the coincidence between 
the construction of the wall and the implementation of the 2003 provision. 
Surely, the barrier will prevent a large number of individuals liable to marry 
from ever meeting one another, just as it can prevent those who are already 
married across the wall from living together. Yet, it is impossible simply to 
prohibit marriage between Palestinians residing on opposite sides of the 
barrier. Hence, the legislator is left with just one option, that of restricting 
the right of residency in order to “deal” with those who, in spite of all, opt 
to marry “beyond the wall”. The logic of the “wall + law” conjunction is 
patent, but its viability is questionable.
Epilogue
In its 15 May 2005 issue, Ha’Aretz reported the latest proposals made 
to the Government by the Head of the National Security Council, Giora 
Eiland, regarding the future of the “provisional” law of 31 July 2003:
Concerned that demands will increase from a growing Arab 
population to transform Israel from a Jewish state into a ‘state 
for all its citizens’, the committee [headed by Eiland] sought 
ways of protecting Israel’s image as a Jewish state by ensuring 
a solid Jewish majority over time. The Committee advised 
adopting laws like the ones now on the books in Denmark or 
Holland, which limit the naturalization of Muslim immigrants.
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Eiland proposes to limit the possibility for illegal aliens 
to legalize their presence, determining economic means tests 
for naturalization, a criterion of attachment to Israel and age 
limitations on those seeking family unification. Eiland also 
proposes preventing Bedouin men from the Negev from 
marrying a number of Palestinian women and requesting Israeli 
citizenship for them, and imposing strict conditions on the 
naturalization of a child with only one Israeli parent.
[…] the ministerial committee for legislation approved 
the extension of the temporary citizenship law of 2003 
… The government wants to extend the law until 2006 while 
it completes changes in the permanent law. The ministerial 
committee accepted the proposal of [Likud] Minister [of 
Immigrant Absorption and Justice] Tzipi Livni to limit family 
unification to men over 35 and women over 25.
According to al-Ayym of 16 May 2005, these provisions, designed 
to alleviate the statute’s strictness, would lead to excluding 76% of family 
unification applications. Whatever happens, the process of perpetuating 
the Law of 31 July 2003 seems to be well under way.
Endnotes
1 This UNDP report quotes a report written by R. Naciri and I. Nusair, entitled The 
Integration of Women’s Rights from the Middle East and North Africa into the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, and presented at the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Network in May 2003.
2 The elements quoted here have been confided by Yasir Abu Marir to Sohad Sakalla, on 13 
August 2003. They are available, in Stein et al. 2004: 22-24. This study was co-sponsored by 
B’Tselem and HaMoked.
3 See Nikfar op. cit: 6, note 33.
4 Information collected during an interview conducted at Birzeit (West Bank), on 8 March 
2005.
5 “Hasbara literally means explanation. It is the term used in Israel for the authorities’ 
communication with the foreign countries. It is a key word in Israel’s political language. 
It designates the official argumentation, the version of the facts, as provided by public 
authorities” (Cypel 2005: 270).
6 This is not the place to analyze the essentialist connotations of expressions such as 
“Moslem fecundity” or, for that matter, “Jewish fecundity”. In this regard, one may refer, 
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respectively, to the valuable works of Rhoda Kanaaneh (2002) and of Susan Martha Kahn 
(2000).
7 Law No. 5710-1950, amended in 1970 (5730-1970).
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The Rise and Fall of a Patriarch: 
A Palestinian Household in Cooperation 
and Conflict
Lamis Abu Nahleh
Abu Nahleh’s nuanced narrative of a Palestinian household 
and its members grappling with the impact of the Israeli occupation 
on their daily lives, the loss of a father and a patriarch, and the 
consequent changes in gender relations and responsibilities within 
the family is taken from her chapter in Palestine Through the Lens 
of the Family: the Dynamics of Place, Resistance and Survival, 
edited by Lisa Taraki to be published by Syracuse University Press 
in autumn 2006. Weaving together the voices of various family 
members – whether a powerful patriarchial father, a daughter whose 
political engagement expands her world, a son facing failure as a 
breadwinner, or a daughter-in-law and divorced daughter whose 
income and management become vital to family survival – Abu 
Nahleh reminds us that power relations in families are not fixed, 
but rather fluid. In the full chapter, Abu Nahleh analyzes narratives 
of six Palestinian families. Abu Nahleh chairs the Master’s program 
at the Institute of Women’s Studies.
The Dar Salem household represents the case of a Palestinian family 
who had to grapple with the impact of the Israeli occupation in three 
stages of its life. The Israeli occupation first deprived them of their home 
and land and demoted them to wage laborers. Throughout three decades, 
the patriarchal head of the household struggled for upward mobility to 
regain some of what the family had lost. In the 1990s, with his death and 
the curfews and strict limitations of mobility accompanying the eruption 
of the second intifada, the family was struck again. The consequences were 
rough. In the course of coping for survival and striving for mobility, the 
family members had to accommodate the changes the family underwent 
in their relations with each other through submission, cooperation, and 
conflict. This dimension of the Dar Salem family is analyzed below in two 
regimes, that of Abdel-Qader the father, and that of Salem the son. 
The account of the first patriarchal regime of Dar Salem represents 
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the rise and fall of the patriarch, Abdel-Qader. Abdel-Qader and Safiyya, 
Salem’s parents, who were paternal cousins, got married in 1956 and by 
1966 they had four children, three daughters and a son. Both descend 
from feudal families that come from a small Palestinian town bordering 
Jerusalem. Before 1948, their families were settled in a village within the 
borders of the Ramallah district where they established homes and owned 
agricultural land. However, they maintained their property and strong 
ties with their extended kin in their town of origin. In 1948, when Israel 
annexed their home town of origin they lost their right to return to it and 
also lost their land, but had kept the title proving their ownership of it. 
Having settled for years in the village and established a family home and 
life, earning their living from their agricultural fields, they were uprooted 
again from their village, which was completely demolished by the Israeli 
army in the course of the1967 war. Safiyya, 77 years old, who was in the 
village that day, recalls the incident painfully: “We did not choose to leave. 
I swear to God, they forcibly threw us all out under the threat of arms… 
everybody, men, women, children, the elderly; some left barefooted and 
some without food or clothes for the children.” Like all the village families, 
they lost their home, their belongings, and official documents, including 
their land title, under the rubble. Forced to flee, the families were dispersed 
and scattered as refugees in different locations in the West Bank. Safiyya 
and her young children had to manage independently until 1969 when they 
got reunited with Abdel-Qader and started a new life inRamallah.. Like 
several other families, they were refugees without official refugee status 
and became laborers. 
“No one could say no to him:” patriarchial decisions and 
marriage strategies
As the head of the household, Abdel-Qader struggled against all 
these losses with two main strategies: establishing a prosperous privately-
owned business and a firm patriarchal family system. He moved across job 
boundaries, starting as a construction worker, then as a contractor for the 
Israeli construction business, and ending up in 1977 running his private 
construction business. Through these years he was able to maintain a 
decent standard of living and a recognized social status in the community. 
He ran his business and took his decisions totally independently and was 
able to accumulate material resources. Until his death he was the main 
source of social and economic support for the members of his household 
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and other extended kin. According to the family members, his character 
played a major role in his success. Munira, his daughter-in-law, fondly 
describes his character saying, “My aunt was engaged to him and waited 
ten years to get married. No one dared to break up their engagement. 
Known to be bold, determined, and never to compromise or give up, no 
one could say no to him.”
At the household level, Abdel-Qader was the sole decision-maker and 
the primary actor who defined the boundaries within which the household 
members could move and act without disrupting the patriarchal system 
he set. Accordingly, their roles and responsibilities were defined, and 
so were the children’s opportunities in education, marriage, and work. 
Endogamous marriage formed a fundamental strategy to sustain continuity 
of the family line, which was ruptured by the Israeli war and occupation, 
and to maintain and strengthen kin relations and contacts. Kin marriage 
started with his own marriage in 1956 and was followed in 1971 by the 
marriage of his eldest daughter, Huda, who had not yet turned fifteen at 
the time, to his sister’s son who was a refugee in Jordan. Safiyya said, “The 
girl cried when she heard the news of her engagement because she was too 
young and understood nothing. I did not interfere. The decision was her 
father’s and my uncle’s.” They saw in Huda’s marriage her only future 
opportunity since she had already quit school Her husband was then taken 
in by Abdel-Qader’s family: he joined his wife in the West Bank by family 
reunion procedures, worked with his uncle, and was treated as a son.
Huda’s sisters and brother all finished their postsecondary studies 
before they got married. Safiyya, their illiterate mother, encouraged their 
education “I have no objection to any field they chose to study. Nothing 
is better than education; it’s a weapon. Do you want them to be illiterate 
like me? Is this better? Of course, it is not.” And Abdel-Qader did not 
object since that did not seem to defy his familial system. In addition, 
university education grew and spread in the Palestinian occupied lands in 
the 1970s, and getting higher education became a common practice for 
that generation. 
Salem’s marriage in 1988 strengthened Abdel-Qader’s patriarchal 
family system. His marriage to his cousin, Munira, also a refugee in Jordan, 
was arranged by his father and her father. On this matter, Safiyya did not 
interfere: “He was staying with his uncle while completing his college 
education. They [his father and uncle] told him, here is your cousin; she 
is better than a stranger [a non-kin].” Salem himself accommodated the 
marriage arrangement saying, “ibn-il-`amm la bint il-`am” (the cousin is 
for his cousin in marriage). It’s our tradition, and our families encouraged 
it.” Munira, though 17 at the time, was against the arranged marriage: “I 
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wanted to refuse Salem, not for any deficiency in him. I was against kin 
marriage… But my father said, ‘do you want to kill me’?” Salem’s and 
Munira’s marriage happened as arranged. With their marriage the nuclear 
household was transformed into an extended household. Abdel-Qader 
insisted that Salem and Munira live with the family although he rented 
an apartment attached to his own and furnished it for them. In addition 
to keeping Salem within the extended family, he kept him economically 
dependent on him. He gave him a job within his private business and 
treated him like any other worker; although Salem had a degree in business 
administration, his father did not give him the opportunity to use his 
education and marginalized him in running the business and the decision-
making process. 
Living in the extended family
Abdel-Qader defined for Salem and Munira the spatial and material 
confines of living within an extended family that would guarantee their 
inability to seek separation from his household. The apartment he rented 
and furnished for them had no proper kitchen but had appliances only 
enough to make a cup of coffee or tea or serve their guests. Living with 
the extended family meant having all their meals and major social events 
in Abdel-Qader’s house and leaving for him enough space to pursue his 
lifestyle away from noise and interference. Salem, as an only son, accepted 
and believed in the idea of being part of the extended family and marginal 
in his father’s business; as a worker, he received a fixed monthly salary 
from his father, which he and Munira were free to spend as they wished. 
He did not attempt to launch battles with his father but simply and 
peacefully lived with the household rules and norms he set. Munira, on the 
other hand, had a few unsuccessful attempts to defy his control. Regarding 
living with the extended family, she said, “We had no choice but to respect 
my uncle’s desire and decision”. Although she knew that separating from 
the family was not negotiable, she still tried twice: 
Once I suggested that I start cooking for my family and 
living within our limited budget but my uncle strictly opposed the 
idea… Another time I proposed moving to a vacant apartment a 
few meters from this house that was larger and better for the girls 
once they are grown up. Salem was convinced of and supported 
the idea, but my uncle was determinedly against it.
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Munira’s battle with Abdel-Qader never reached the stage of 
outrightconflict. She was more successful in her other attempts to resist 
the patriarchal family system, in matters related to her work and the kind 
of education she desired for her daughters. He detached himself from these 
disputes, which she had to resolve with her husband and the other women 
in the family; they were matters that did not defy the terms acceptable 
to him. In general, he was not opposed to women’s education, work, or 
mobility. His youngest daughter, Laila, finished her undergraduate studies, 
had a job, was mobile, spent her salary as she wished, and did not get 
married until she was twenty-six. According to her, he never interfered or 
pressured her. In her marriage and her divorce one year later, she said she 
had full freedom of choice although her ex-husband was the son of one of 
her father’s friends. She was supported by her father to file for divorce and 
after the divorce she brought her infant daughter to stay in her natal family 
house. Like Munira, she was aware that living in Abdel-Qader’s home, 
though beneficial to her as a divorced woman, also meant lack of privacy 
and independence, yet she could not challenge the conditions of life there. 
She describes her experience: 
The catastrophe is not the divorce but what follows it. 
If you did not have a strong personality, independence, and a 
sufficient income, you’re in trouble. Even if you did you need 
to have a supportive family to allow you this independence; 
otherwise it is catastrophic … [However] in this house, you 
cannot live at comfort or in privacy. The house has an elderly 
person [the father] who is in control of everything… My child 
and I had to accommodate to his lifestyle and not intrude on his 
quiet evenings or afternoons at home. We had to wait until he 
went to bed to sleep or else sleep in the guest room on the floor 
because we had no room of our own. 
“This daughter is worth one hundred men”: Siham join the 
national struggle
Up to this point in the family’s life, Abdel-Qader’s household could 
fit “the principal-agent [non-cooperative household] model… in which 
one partner had a clear advantage in determining intra-household resource 
allocation by virtue of his ownership of the means of production” (Katz 
1997, 35). However, Abdel-Qader’s power and control were not derived 
only from his being the owner of the business and the main household 
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provider. In many contexts, control and power are derived from access 
to other extra-household resources that may be social, cultural, and 
ideological. In the Palestinian context, affiliation with a political party and 
involvement in the national struggle forms a major source of power. It is 
true that his patriarchal power and system could not be resisted or shaken 
up to a point. However, his patriarchal control faced major challenges 
when Siham, his second daughter, grew up to be a secondary student and 
thus eligible to enter the arena of political and national struggle. All the 
family members agreed that Siham was the only member who dared to 
challenge him because she took after him, yet of all members she gained 
his greatest love and fondness; he always said, “this daughter of mine is 
worth one hundred men.” Siham describes her rebellion. “At that time I 
knew nothing. I could not even reach the center of town by myself.” In the 
mid-seventies, she joined a leftist party and became active in the student 
movement:
I developed an ideological outlook, which was in my father’s 
view too revolutionary; this created a serious conflict between 
us. My mother indirectly encouraged me to join the party, 
when she explained to me that they were good and patriotic 
people. She tried to forbid me from going out on the streets to 
demonstrate or clash with the soldiers; she was worried I’d be 
shot or arrested.
At that time, Siham was not the only one who had a progressive leftist 
ideology or who got involved in the national struggle against the Israeli 
occupation. She and all other family members showed nostalgia for that 
period when all the community around them, men and women, including 
extended kin, neighbors, friends and acquaintances, went along the same 
path. But her father avoided knowing about her political activism because 
he was concerned about getting arrested or attacked by the Israeli army; he 
repeatedly warned her saying, “Don’t force me to confront the occupation. 
I have a home and a family to care for.” Although he was proud of her 
political stand and argumentative ability and often called her to debate 
politics with the Israelis he did business with, he sometimes used physical 
force to stop her activism and get her “off the path she chose,” as she put 
it. Upon completing secondary school, Siham was offered a scholarship to 
study abroad, which aggravated the conflict with her father. The mother, 
Safiyya, claims she stayed out of this matter. In this endeavor, Siham said 
she was supported by Salem. Salem analyzed his father’s position: 
layout-V3E.indd   57 09/11/1426, 05:32:49 ã
58
My father never consulted with anybody on any decision he 
took except when he doubted the consequences of his decision. 
He wanted someone to blame in case the decision turned out 
to be wrong. That was the first time he consulted with me, but I 
know [now], in practice the decision was his and his orders were 
to be obeyed.
Siham went abroad without the explicit approval of her father. 
It is true he paid the fees for my scholarship but did not 
accompany me to Jordan to put me on the plane and wish me 
farewell like fathers do…. In his mind, my political activism did 
not ruin my social reputation so he can depend on me living 
abroad… Later I understood that he was forced to approve 
thinking that he would avoid political dangers by sending me 
away.
To her father’s surprise, Siham came back with the outbreak of the 
first intifada and rejoined the ranks of the national struggle. She had 
also chosen a marriage partner while abroad. When she refused all other 
suitors, her father gave up: “My daughter made it easy for me; she brought 
her future husband with her.” Siham remembers him saying: “my daughter 
is a hopeless case; no way can I convince her to change her mind.” 
The fall of the patriarch
Only in the last year of his life did Abdel-Qader’s children defy 
him and his decisions. In the last stage of his life, he took a number of 
decisions that alienated the entire family: He sold the land he owned for 
a cheap price, he was planning to start a business abroad, and there were 
rumors about him planning a second marriage. Laila describes her father’s 
last days:
Though he never consulted with us, this time we went nuts. 
All of us, Siham, Salem and myself, stood together and succeeded 
in preventing him from going abroad. That period was miserable 
for us…In the last few days he was in so much pain. We’re used to 
him always being strong. I was in so much pain too. He died and I 
did not know whether I was sad for him or over him… However, 
the real catastrophe began after he died…Acting on his own, my 
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brother Salem took a few decisions, which destroyed him and 
destroyed us. 
Salem, who never objected to his father or challenged his 
power, was aware of how he limited his opportunities. 
My father lived under specific conditions that affected 
his character. He was strict not knowing mercy. He was strict 
with me because he wanted me to be firm… He was very kind, 
compassionate, and generous, but more with outsiders than with 
us. He could not distinguish friends from non-friends. After his 
death, the friends remained and the opportunists disappeared. 
There is nothing I could have learned from him. Each of us is 
a different personality. I took his generous character, but our 
conditions are different. I gained power and control through 
him. When he went, the social and economic prosperity went 
with him.
Munira expresses the extent of his loss:
I doubt if anyone his age had lived his life. He was in full 
control of his life and decisions. He was both powerful and 
passionate. We lost a lot by his death. We never thought of 
observing how he dealt with the issues of life. We never benefited 
from his presence nor questioned where from he derived his 
power, respect, and status. Everything was under his control. 
And we let the boat sail!
The death of Abdel-Qader in 1997 started the second patriarchal 
regime of Dar Salem when Salem, the son, assumed control of the family 
business and the extended household. At the age of 41, he became the 
head of the household, which consisted of himself and seven females: his 
mother Safiyya (77); his wife Munira (36); his three daughters, Nawal 
(13), Yara (10), and Zeinab (8); his divorced sister (36); and her daughter, 
Nadia (8). For the first year, the family continued as before. Munira had a 
job and was in control of her salary, and her three daughters were enrolled 
in a private school. Laila also had a regular job and was in control of her 
salary. The housing arrangement remained as it had been, two living spaces 
but one extended household. Safiyya occupied the status of the elder 
of the house but was not in full control. Her new status opened space 
for paternal and maternal relatives, not only to visit all the time but to 
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interfere in family matters, a condition that was never acceptable when 
Abdel-Qader was alive. As the head of the household, Salem took charge 
of providing for the family from the income earned by the family business. 
Knowing that he was not the sole heir to the family business, he had to 
get the approval of his mother and sisters to use the assets his father had 
left to develop his business. Laila said that she and her sisters gave up their 
right to claim their inheritance: “We gave up our right to him because he 
was our only brother. Our only condition was that he would maintain 
the business.” Following in his father’s footsteps, he ran the business 
independently without consulting with anyone. He tried to establish his 
own regime by modernizing the production equipment; however, not 
being used to decision-making and lacking experience in business deals, 
he led the business into bankruptcy. The family was shocked when the 
debtors started knocking on the door. 
Business crisis: new gender roles and responsibilities
This business crisis brought about a lot of conflicts among the 
household members and between them and their relatives. Salem’s sisters 
threatened to claim their share in the business. Munira’s natal family 
was accused of causing part of the crisis. Munira acted fast to rescue 
her husband and asked the assistance of her natal family in Jordan to 
pay some of the debt. In this crisis, Munira the cousin was considered a 
sister-in-law/daughter-in-law and instead of being appreciated was blamed 
for acting independently. However, all of Salem’s immediate and distant 
relatives agreed that he had to bear the consequences of his mistakes. With 
the eruption of the intifada accompanied by the Israeli invasion, closures, 
and mobility restrictions, the status of the business worsened; Salem had 
to lay off his staff, yet the revenues were too slim to pay back any debt. 
He emphasized that “if it were not for the intifada and the closures, 
which prevented us from accessing our output markets, we would have 
been in a better position at least to pay back our debts.” Irrespective of 
their conflicts, the end result was the same: The business was sinking in 
debt and Laila and Munira had no option but to cooperate to bear the 
brunt of the shock. Laila secretly sold some of her gold; Munira and Laila 
pooled their monthly income. Munira had to do overtime work for pay 
and Laila did Palestinian embroidery to earn extra income. Laila was given 
the responsibility of managing the tight household resources; she and the 
rest of the members employed all possible household coping strategies to 
make ends meet. Evaluating their socioeconomic status at this stage, Salem 
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says: “We abandoned the tradition of living luxuriously and went back to 
the families we originally belonged to,” referring to the 1967 era when he 
was a child. As Munira put it, “I can say we are now living on the poverty 
line in economic terms when we used to be classified as a middle class 
family.” Laila, however, expresses nostalgia and determination to revive 
the golden age of the family, “I have never dreamt in my life that we would 
accept welfare assistance…We never experienced debt during my father’s 
lifetime. Abu Salem’s household must maintain its decent status.”
The repercussions caused dramatic changes in gender roles, mostly 
afflicting Salem. Losing his main source of income and his ability to 
provide for the family, he suffered the crisis of the male breadwinner. 
Although Salem believed there was nothing he could learn from his father, 
he did inherit his patriarchal culture. On turning from a provider to a 
dependent, he expressed feelings of self-worthlessness: 
It is known that the head of the household provides for 
his family, and when one is used to be the provider and then his 
wife and sister provide for him, he becomes dependent. I am 
considered a dependent... For a whole year I have contributed 
very little to the household income. I felt belittled. You know, 
we have experienced a great deal of humiliation from the 
occupation and from people, but there is nothing worse than 
being humiliated with death. 
Munira saw that seeking an alternative income would help Salem 
regain his status: “I encouraged him to find work; even as a worker; a job 
would give him an income and that way he would be independent and in 
control; then he wouldn’t need anyone.” But Salem believed that the only 
strategy that would rescue him was to devote himself and his time to the 
business. The only thing that would bring back his pride and status was to 
recover the glory of the family business. Most of the time he was under 
pressure and tension, and to avoid conflict with household members and 
to save himself “the embarrassment of looking her [his wife] straight into 
the eye,” he spent most of his waking hours at work.
Being job-keepers, Laila and Munira became the main providers 
for the family, and they also occupied the status of the decision-makers 
regarding almost all decisions concerning allocation of household 
resources. Although they all agreed that the three consult before a 
decision is taken, in practice Laila is the main decision maker, and Salem 
and Munira accommodate her decision and appreciate her financial and 
managerial assistance, without which they would have not managed. 
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Munira confirmed that she and Laila often take the decision and then ask 
Salem for his opinion, “although we know he would agree but only to 
maintain respect for his status.” The relations of the household members 
also showed conflicts on various matters such as the household division 
of labor, Munira’s work outside, kin interference, and so forth. The 
conflict that Munira and Laila constantly had to deal with was creating a 
balance between the benefits of living within an extended family and the 
longing for separation and privacy. However, both are conscious of the 
force of the patriarchal family norm. Munira stresses, “Even if we were 
financially well-off we cannot leave my aunt [Salem’s mother], we feel she 
is our responsibility.” Munira feels that Safiyya is not a mother-in-law but 
a mother to her and says, “I promised myself that if she got sick- God 
forbid- I shall cooperate with Laila to take care of her, even if that meant 
leaving my work.” Laila, who always complained about the burden of 
housework and accuses her brother’s family for causing this burden, says, 
“I sometimes tell them jokingly, you are settlers, occupiers, go home. But I 
won’t leave my elderly mother alone and I cannot deprive her of her only 
son. I understand her need for him to be close to her.”
Conjugal Disputes, New Religiosity, and a Daughter’s Future
The socioeconomic and political conditions that prevailed during 
Abdel-Qader’s lifetime differed from those that prevailed after his death. 
Toward the end of the 1990s, economic conditions started worsening and 
deteriorated with the disruption of the peace process and the eruption 
of the intifada. The leftist, progressive, and secular political forces that 
prevailed in the 1980s retracted from the political public arena, while the 
religious and Islamic forces spread and expanded. In the process, as it is the 
case in other societies under conflict and economic hardships, the current 
living conditions in Palestine characterized by the deteriorating economic 
conditions, unpredictability, insecurity, and constant tension, along with 
the rise and expansion of Islamic radical movements which have been 
actively involved in mobilization and service provision, both in Palestine 
and the whole region, led to a politicized religiosity. 
This new trend created constant overt disputes between Munira 
and Salem and covert negotiations between Munira and Laila, which 
were enacted on their dynamics with the children, particularly the eldest 
of the daughters Nawal (13). Winning the battle over issues related to 
Nawal meant winning the battles with the three younger ones. In 1997, 
following the death of her father, and like the majority of women relatives 
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and friends, Laila donned shar`i (Islamic) dress and started observing all 
the duties of a Muslim. The young generation was affected earlier by the 
spread of political Islam. Young men joined the Islamic movements and 
young girls started wearing the hijab (head cover). One year preceding the 
current intifada, Salem quit drinking alcohol, he started praying and fasting, 
and he also joined the crowd of men in the mosque every evening to attend 
religious sessions after prayers. At present he is socially conservative and 
tries to influence Nawal’s (and his younger daughters’) outlook. Most 
familiy memberswere highly affected by the Islamist surge, except for 
Munira and Siham (and Siham’s husband), both of whom are among the 
very few women in the extended family and the local community who do 
not observe Islamic dress. The conflicts in Dar Salem emerge mostly on 
issues related to 13-year-old Nawal: Should she wear the hijab? Should she 
quit dancing with the dabkeh (folklore dance) group? Should she travel 
abroad with the dabkeh group? Should she continue higher education? 
Should it be here or abroad? 
Now that Salem has turned into a “real Muslim believer” as he 
identifies himself, he holds a different social outlook than Munira 
regarding Nawal’s education, work, and marriage. He does not mind her 
education to any level she desires, as long as she stays here. Referring to 
his earlier position regarding Siham’s education, he clarifies, “This is my 
daughter. I am worried about her and cannot ensure she’ll be safe abroad.” 
According to him, she can choose any field of study, except “what is not 
acceptable in our Islamic society, like acting. This I will firmly oppose.” 
As for her marriage, he encourages marriage at the age of 18 for girls and 
boys and does not mind if Nawal chooses to get married before finishing 
her education. As for her wearing the hijab and leaving the dabkeh group, 
he states: 
Nawal wants to wear the hijab and this is my desire too. I 
do not approve of her dancing with the dabkeh group. I want her 
to quit but she should be convinced and should approve of that. 
I do insist and nag her on that…That a girl dances hand in hand 
with a boy is not only wrong but haram. It is haram both by the 
shari`a and religion. 
Laila has a similar perspective but claims that she does not interfere: 
I know that Nawal is an outstanding performer in the 
dabkeh. Believe me I cried from joy when I saw her on the stage 
that I even made my daughter join a dabkeh group… I agree that 
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she should quit, but if her mother and her father approve of her 
staying in the group I don’t interfere. We try… I try but the 
decision is her parents’ decision. 
Nawal’s mother has a totally different view of Nawal’s opportunities 
and outlook. She insists on higher education for all three girls; she wants 
them to get at least their B.A. before they get married and would not 
compromise on that; she also encourages her daughters to work. Regarding 
her position on religious beliefs and practices, Munira stresses that she is a 
believer but that religious beliefs should not lead people to become blindly 
conservative; to her, people should make decisions out of free will but first 
they have to be aware and well-informed. This is reflected in bringing up 
Nawal:
 
I suffer a lot in raising my daughter [Nawal]. I cannot 
reach her. This religiosity trend cropped up all of a sudden and 
she accommodates to it without reasoning. She is so confused. 
One time it’s her father, another the school…One day she wants 
the dabkeh and another she doesn’t. Her cousin wears the hijab, 
she wants to wear it too. This idea of religion, that everything is 
haram, haram, haram. I tell her you should not hold on to the 
idea without being informed. 
Concerning Nawal’s wearing the hijab, Munira is determined that she 
should not take a decision before she is eighteen. After that she cannot 
force her to do anything one way or the other. 
Nawal herself reflects all the contradictions and conflicts in Dar 
Salem, the school, and the neighborhood. She is internalizing nationalist, 
religious, secular, and modern values all at the same time. Nawal aspires 
to become an astronomer; however, she would compromise and study 
sociology, a field of interest to her, if the Palestinian universities do not 
offer astronomy. She justifies her compromise with a nationalist argument, 
“If we study abroad, we are tempted not to return to our country. Our 
country needs all the educated Palestinians to develop it.” Although she 
is ambitious to finish university education, she does not seem to mind 
getting married earlier; she says: “If I had a good chance for marriage, 
I don’t know, my ambition might change.” Regarding work, she would 
want to work because she doesn’t like staying at home. But she is ready to 
compromise because as she says, “I don’t want work to stand between me 
and my husband. I can always engage in activities in the house.” She goes 
on and repeats her mother’s view: “Sometimes a woman works for her self-
| The Rise and Fall of  a Patriarch: A Palestinian Household in Cooperation and Conflict
layout-V3E.indd   64 09/11/1426, 05:32:51 ã
65Review of  Women Studies |
worth and when she is determined to work she will decide to do that when 
she turns eighteen.” On the issue of hijab, Nawal says, “I wanted to wear 
it. My father approved, but I knew my mother was against it before I turn 
eighteen.” The teachers at school seem to encourage it and some scold and 
punish those girls who don’t wear it. Nawal said that at school she learnt 
that “the hijab gives a girl self-confidence and protects her from being 
harassed on the street.” She adds that several girls wear the hijab out of 
jealousy and not “as our religion instructs us,” as she put it. Then she adds: 
“as my mother says, some girls wear the hijab but do not have morals.” She 
is willing to stay in the dabkeh group until she turns sixteen and her “body 
matures and looks like a grown-up woman.” 
Munira thinks her guidance and education will help Nawal sort out 
her conflicts as she grows up. She states:
I try to instill in my daughter that she should learn to be 
able to decide on her own. Not to imitate others… to live her life 
as it comes… In my opinion, the decision in the end is hers. You 
provide her with education and the proper conditions. Then, she 
can decide for herself. 
Throughout the three stages of their life, the Dar Salem family has 
been in constant interaction with the local community they belonged to 
and the larger Palestinian community in resistance and struggle against 
the Israeli occupation. What is significant about this family, although not 
unique to it, is how the changes and interactions it underwent were enacted 
on the internal gender dynamics, primarily represented in ideological 
conflict among the family members. During Abdel-Qader’s regime, the 
family members largely accommodated his control. However, at various 
points in time, conflict over intra-household power relations prevailed 
through covert and overt negotiation mechanisms; the latter was mostly 
expressed in Siham’s relation with her father. Although she was young 
and still economically dependent on her father, she had access to non-
material sources beyond the household (the community and the political 
party) which empowered her to launch a battle with her father, whom no 
family member could defy. The shaking of patriarchal authority at the end 
of Abdel-Qader’s regime could not be redressed during Salem’s regime. 
Not very long after he assumed his father’s position, Salem suffered the 
psychological impact of the male breadwinner’s loss of work and income. 
Unlike in the cases of Abu Khaled and Nathem, both of whom also lost 
their jobs and income, he suffered his crisis silently placing his efforts in 
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a challenge he was aware he had no chance to win. Also, loss of his work 
and income caused major changes in the household relations and gender 
roles: Not only did Munira and Laila become the primary providers, but 
they also assumed decision making status. In contrast with his father’s 
regime, early on in his regime, overt conflict surfaced in intra-household 
relations and dynamics, particularly when the family members analyzed 
the economic crisis that he caused. With the negotiations reaching the 
practical level of dealing with the crisis, intra-household cooperation 
overruled conflict. However, this does not mean that conflict over power 
relations disappeared; in fact, it surfaced in a different way as the household 
members attempted to promote their ideology through the socialization 
of the young daughters. 
 
| The Rise and Fall of  a Patriarch: A Palestinian Household in Cooperation and Conflict
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Naming the Crime: 
‘Honour’, Rights and Wrongs
Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain 
The following is an abbreviated version of the introduction 
to Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence Against Women, 
edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain and published by 
Zed Press in autumn 2005. This important volume is an outcome 
of a collaborative, action-oriented research project that involved 
individuals and organizations around the globe in mapping, 
disseminating information, and facilitating the development of 
strategies to combat ‘crimes of honour.’ As the editors note, the 
project’s framework was international human rights law and 
‘crimes of honor’ were viewed primarily as a manifestation of 
violence against women and a violation of women’s human rights. 
In the volume, the authors situated ‘crimes of honour,’ “within an 
understanding of violence against women which, as Coomeraswamy 
and Kois (1999, 177) point out, ‘accepts the fact that structures that 
perpetuate violence against women are socially constructed and that 
such violence is a product of a historical process and is not essential 
or time bound in its manifestations.’” 
The book also interrogates “the concept of ‘honour’ itself, as 
well as challenging its invocation to justify violence against women” 
and the authors also give careful consideration to the global context, 
including, for example, Western stereotyping of Muslims and 
Muslim societies. From the editors’ introduction, the Review has 
taken sections which examine the problem of naming these acts 
of violence against women as “crimes of honor.” Welchman and 
Hosain follow Lama Abu Odeh in noting and problematizing the 
stereotypical division where “crimes of passion” are committed in 
Western societies and “crimes of honor” in the East. But whatever 
the name, readers will benefit from a volume that brings to bear the 
expertise of scholars, lawyers and activists around the globe to share 
strategies for combatting a widespread form of violence against 
women.
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The editors of the Review thank Welchman and Hossain for 
their kind permission to publish this version of their introduction. 
Lynn Welchman is Senior Lecturer in Islamic and Middle Eastern 
Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 
London and has also taught in the master’s program of the Institute 
of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University. Previously she was also 
Director of SOAS’s Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern law 
(CIMEL). Sara Hossain is a practising lawyer at the Supreme Court 
of Bangladesh in Dhaka, where she specialises in constitutional, 
human rights and public interest law, and is also a member of Ain 
o Salish Kendro, a leading national human rights organisation. 
Previously she was South Asia Legal Officer at INTERIGHTS, 
the London-based international human rights law centre. Hossain 
and Welchman co-directed the CIMEL/INTERIGHTS ‘crimes 
of honour’ project from which this volume has resulted. As well as 
this volume, the five-year project produced a number of research 
resources (see www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes) as well as convening 
a number of meetings that brought together scholars and activists 
(Welchman 2000). 
The definition of ‘crimes of honour’ is by no means straightforward, 
and the imprecision and ‘exoticisation’ (in particular in the West) of its 
use are among the reasons for caution in use of the phrase. Our project 
generally uses the term ‘crimes of honour’ to encompass a variety of 
manifestations of violence against women, including ‘honour killings’, 
assault, confinement or imprisonment, and interference with choice 
in marriage, where the publicly articulated ‘justification’ is attributed 
to a social order claimed to require the preservation of a concept of 
‘honour’ vested in male (family and/or conjugal) control over women and 
specifically women’s sexual conduct, actual, suspected or potential. 
At its most basic, the term is commonly used as shorthand, to flag 
a type of violence against women characterised by (claimed) ‘motivation’ 
rather than by perpetrator or form of manifestation. Definitions tend to 
be by way of illustration; thus, in a highly significant article on ‘crimes 
of honour’ and the construction of gender in the Arab world, Lama Abu 
Odeh explains that: 
A paradigmatic example of a crime of honour is the killing 
of a woman by her father or brother for engaging in, or being 
suspected of engaging in, sexual practices before or outside 
marriage. (Abu Odeh, 1996: 141). 
| Naming the Crime: ‘Honour’, Rights and Wrongs
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In her 1999 Report, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women records receiving ‘numerous communications’ on the subject of 
‘honour crimes’ against women, ‘whereby the family kills a female relative 
deemed to have defiled the honour of the family.’ She continues with 
information on ‘honour crimes’ in Lebanon: 
Honour is defined in terms of women’s assigned sexual and 
familial roles as dictated by traditional family ideology. Thus, 
adultery, premarital relationships (which may or may not include 
sexual relations), rape and falling in love with an “inappropriate” 
person may constitute violations of family honour.1
Papers in this volume discuss the concept of ‘conjugal honour’ as 
well as ‘family honour’ and document ‘honour killings’ by husbands and 
sexual intimates who are not blood relatives of the victim, thus extending 
the range of ‘paradigmatic’ perpetrators. It is also argued that in some 
contexts, the range of female behaviour considered to violate ‘honour’ goes 
beyond sexual conduct (actual, potential or suspected) to include other 
behaviours that challenge male control (Aida Touma-Sliman notes ‘staying 
out late and smoking’, for example). At the same time, the contributions 
by Uma Chakravarti, Dina Siddiqi and Hannana Siddiqui clarify how these 
paradigms of ‘honour’ interfere with the right to choice in marriage across 
South Asia; forced marriage is one result, but other scenarios include 
being forced to remain in an unwanted relationship, or punished for 
leaving (or trying to leave) one, or exercising choice regarding whether 
to marry or not, and whom to marry. As well as the ‘honour’ invested in 
control over women and specifically women’s sexual conduct, control over 
economic and social resources and property are often intimately linked in 
these equations. In addition, papers in this volume (Nazand Begikhani, 
Aida Touma-Sliman, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian) note the significance 
attached to female virginity and the resulting imposition (or attempted 
imposition) of virginity testing on females suspected of having ‘violated’ 
family honour, including through having been subjected to rape. ‘Crimes 
of honour’ may thus include violations of a range of rights as well as the 
more ‘paradigmatic’ ‘honour killings.’ The role of women family members 
in instigating or colluding with honour crimes, particularly in enforcing 
controls over marriage choices, and also in acts of violence, is also brought 
out in this volume as an issue that requires greater consideration and 
explanation.
Working on ‘crimes of honour’ as a form of violence against women 
does not imply that men also are not subjected to such crimes. For 
layout-V3E.indd   69 09/11/1426, 05:32:52 ã
70
example, in the province of Sindh in 1998, the Human Rights Commission 
of Pakistan analysed the deaths of 97 men as well as 158 women in karo-
kari ‘honour killings’ (Amnesty International, 1999: 6). Again, in cases of 
forced marriage or interference with the right of choice whether or not 
and whom to marry, pressure from older family members over younger 
members will apply to men as well as to women…However, women 
remain the majority of victims and survivors of ‘crimes of honour’, and 
have fewer available remedies. Therefore development of strategies of 
support can effectively draw on the existing frameworks established to 
address all manifestations of violence against women. 
Among feminist and rights activists seeking to eliminate such 
violence, there is deep discomfort over the apparent meaning of the term 
‘honour’ in the construction ‘crimes of honour’ as this seems to imply 
that women ‘embody’ the honour of males. There is also resistance to 
accepting a notion of honour that endorses and indeed requires violence 
against women, epitomised in the extreme example of an ‘honour killing.’ 
Thus in 1994, Al-Badil (‘The Alternative’), established from organisations 
within the Palestinian community in Israel, called itself the Coalition to 
Combat the Crime of ‘Family Honour’ encapsulating through quotation 
marks its own interrogation of the term. In its statement of purpose the 
organisation observed: 
it is not possible to give the term [‘family honour’] a positive 
understanding, since it attributes all the maladies of society to 
women’s bodies and individual behaviour, giving legitimacy to 
social conduct restricting women’s freedom and development, 
using all forms of violence, the most extreme being murder. 
In the search for a better way of naming, the majority of ‘honour 
killings’ appear to fit into the understanding of femicide defined by 
Radford (1992: 3) as ‘the misogynous killing of women by men’ and as 
‘a form of sexual violence’. She uses the concept of “sexual violence” as a 
continuum in a radical feminist analysis: 
The notion of a continuum further facilitates the analysis 
of male sexual violence as a form of control central to the 
maintenance of patriarchy.[…] Relocating femicide within the 
continuum of sexual violence establishes its significance in terms 
of sexual politics. (Radford 1992, 4). 
| Naming the Crime: ‘Honour’, Rights and Wrongs
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Further developing this notion, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2002) 
argues for another continuum, in which ‘femicide’ would indicate a range 
of acts and situations including not only the physical killing of women 
because they are women, but also threats and other components of 
the ‘arduous process leading up to the actual death’. Nadera Shalhoub-
Kevorkian situates her proposal solidly in the framework of her clinical 
experience in Palestinian society while recommending it also for analysis 
of other societies in light of the cross-cultural nature of the phenomenon 
of femicide. 
It is clear that most ‘honour killings’ fit immediately into both the 
narrower and wider understandings of femicide proposed above, while other 
‘crimes of honour’ (such as interference with choice in marriage, physical 
abuse, intimidation, deprivation of liberty) might be covered either by the 
sexual violence continuum or by Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian’s expanded 
definition of femicide. Such methods of naming have the clear advantage 
of unpacking the term and indicating the socio-economic and patriarchal 
frameworks in which such acts are committed and sustained, rather than 
reproducing the representation of that framework, with or without 
quotation marks around ‘honour’ to indicate the user’s interrogation of the 
term. The assimilation of such crimes to a wider framework has the added 
advantage of avoiding the self-exculpation undertaken by some in the West 
who view such crimes as a problem of ‘the other’, risking paternalistic and 
ineffective interventions and the ‘demonisation’ of particular communities 
and, in particular, men within them.
The use of the term ‘honour crime’, or specifically ‘honour killing’, has 
at least two further risks: firstly that it takes the description articulated by 
the perpetrator; and secondly, that reproducing the term may obscure (as 
may be the intention on the part of the perpetrator) the “real motivation” 
(or at least, contributing motivational factors) for the crime or attempted 
crime. In regard to the latter, sociological investigations of ‘family honour’ 
in different contexts indicate that ‘the normative claim of honor often is 
mixed with social, economic, or political motives’ (Araji, 2000) – that is, 
that ‘family honour’ is tied to social standing and mobility, and economic 
opportunities. 
Besides the general and familiar association of women with property 
in the ‘honour’ paradigm, there are many instances in which the primary 
motivation for an ‘honour crime’ is more directly something other than 
‘honour’ – a brother’s arguments with his sister over inheritance, for 
example, or a husband’s desire to be rid of a wife, with a murder not so 
much covered up as proclaimed as a matter of ‘honour’ in the expectation 
of a minimal punishment and less disapprobation from at least some 
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sections of society than otherwise would have been the case.2 The claims of 
‘honour’ may be a contributing factor, but as Nafisa Shah has commented, 
‘Vested interests… use the excuse of honour as a blanket cover for a 
multitude of sins.’3 And mostly, the voice of victim in her own ‘defence’ is 
absent, as underlined by studies in this volume. 
As to the problem of reproducing, even in quotations marks, the 
articulated motivation of the perpetrator or sympathisers in the family 
or society, we come up against the questions posed by Dobash and 
Dobash (1998: 4) in regard to the source of definitions of violence against 
women:
Do we use the perspectives of victims? Of those 
who perpetrate the acts? Of researchers? Of the law? Of 
policymakers? Should researchers attempt to develop distinct, 
abstract, and definitive conceptualizations of these acts?
In this volume, Uma Chakravarti argues against continued use of the 
term ‘crimes of honour’ because ‘as feminists, we must discard the term 
in search of another that does not mask the violence in the killings and 
abuses,’ and ‘because the violence becomes associated with the ‘uniqueness 
of Asian cultures, with irrational communities and aberrant and archaic 
patriarchal practices refusing to modernise’ (see also Purna Sen in this 
volume). 
Still, problematic though it is, the term ‘crimes of honour’ has some 
uses in particular contexts. It is used in the project, as by some activists, to 
destabilise the notion of ‘honour’ as a received good when connected with 
crime. It is also used to extend an understanding of what might be called 
‘crimes of honour’ beyond ‘honour killings’, one way of demonstrating 
the continuum of acts of violence on which ‘honour killings’ stand. It 
has obvious descriptive implications in its indication of the link that may, 
in particular contexts, be assumed in law, judicial process and societal 
practice connecting a ‘crime’ with a mitigating value, ‘honour.’ The idea 
of mitigation or impunity in statute or judicial practice for a ‘crime of 
honour’ is most immediately evoked in ‘honour killing’, but it also arises 
in other manifestations of crimes of ‘honour’. 
The most obvious advantage of the use of the phrase ‘honour crimes’ 
in an English-language context is the wide recognition of the term, but 
this is at the same time increasingly problematic… The association of 
phenomena of ‘crimes of honour’ with the ‘East’ (Abu Odeh, 1997 and 
see Uma Chakravarti in this volume) – and often with Muslim societies in 
particular – is one of the problems. 
| Naming the Crime: ‘Honour’, Rights and Wrongs
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Crimes of honour, crimes of passion
In her paper, Jane Connors notes that among the disagreements at 
UN discussions of ‘crimes of honour’ from the year 2000 was the inclusion 
of ‘crimes of passion’ with ‘crimes of honour’ in resolutions on violence 
against women.4 She notes the objection of the representative of Jordan, to 
the effect that ‘How could states possibly exercise due diligence to prevent 
such crimes, if the crime in question is committed in a sudden spurt of 
rage?’5 The significance of this intervention lies in the fact that most 
defences in criminal cases of ‘honour killings’ of women in Jordan argue 
that the crime was committed in a ‘fit of fury’, or indeed a ‘sudden spurt 
of anger’ in reaction to some (alleged) conduct on the part of the woman, 
allowing the court to rule on ‘manslaughter’ rather than premeditated 
murder and to reduce the penalty accordingly. The discussions on Jordan, 
Lebanon and Iraqi Kurdistan in this volume provide further evidence that 
it is rare indeed for a defendant to rely on particular provisions in national 
legislation that are the target of advocacy campaigns by those combating 
‘crimes of honour’. These provisions provide for a reduced penalty in 
the event that a man finds his wife or certain female relatives in the act 
of extra-marital sex, and kills one or both of them on the spot. As Lama 
Abu Odeh (1997, 306) points out, in the case of ‘honour killings’ in Arab 
countries, ‘the legal locus of these crimes is less the immediate legislation 
and more the general provocation rule found in almost every Arab Penal 
Code’. Sohail Warraich’s discussion in this volume of the use by Pakistani 
courts of the ‘grave and sudden provocation defence’ in cases of ‘honour 
killings’ provides considerable comparative material. 
There is a growing literature on the relationship and differences of 
crimes of honour and of passion. In the legal field, Abu Odeh (1997, 
290) uses her earlier work on ‘crimes of honour’ in the Arab world in 
a comparative examination of the judicial treatment by US courts of ‘the 
killing of women in the heat of passion for sexual or intimate reasons.’ In 
focussing on how each legal system justifies its tolerance for the murder of 
a woman in particular circumstances, she demonstrates that the tensions 
in each system ‘although sometimes defined differently, have been 
surprisingly resolved in the same way’ – in particular this comparison is 
made between the ‘fit of fury’ mitigation in Arab penal codes and practice, 
and the US plea of extreme emotional distress, which builds on the premise 
that loss of ‘self-control’ reduces culpability. 
One difference that is often assumed between crimes of ‘passion’ 
and of ‘honour’ is the relationship of the perpetrator to the victim. The 
difference here lies in the murder of women by those who are or have 
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been their sexual intimates (husbands, lovers) and those who have not 
been (close blood relatives). Other than the documented instances of 
the murder of women after incestual rape in ‘crimes of honour’, as noted 
above, it is the case that not only ‘family honour’ but also ‘conjugal 
honour’ may be cited as a ‘motivation’ by the perpetrator.. Commenting 
on research in Lebanon, Serhan posits that the greater number of husbands 
as perpetrators may reflect ‘a change in the conceptualization of family 
honour’ (Foster, 2001, 26). In Pakistan, figures from Sindh province from 
1998 illustrate that the husband was the perpetrator in nearly 50% of 
cases of karo-kari killings where the woman alone was killed (Amnesty 
International, 1999, 6).
Even granted the paradigmatic family (as compared to conjugal) 
dynamic of ‘honour’, the response of courts in the ‘West’ faced with 
defences of passion or provocation can be examined for similarities with 
those of courts faced with ‘honour’ defences, at least in considering the 
implications of a passion/honour continuum that recognises, at some 
point, a justification for the use of violence against women as a part of 
control by family and intimates. As Leader-Elliott (1997, 169) asks in the 
context of law in the ‘West’: 
Is it not an unacceptable paradox that the progressive 
restriction of a husband’s power to exert lawful control over 
his wife has been accompanied by a progressive enlargement of a 
partial excuse for killing her? 
The complex background to such developments across the world 
includes rapid social change among and within different countries 
and communities, and ‘globalizing’ cultural dynamics (for example of 
‘modernity’) that, as they are seen to open (some) women’s choices, may be 
experienced by (some) men as threats. Such factors vary in their impact in 
different communities, but have to be taken into account in an assessment 
of family violence. Baker, Gregware and Cassidy (1999, 166) argue that 
‘honor should be part of any current conceptualisation of patriarchy’ in 
comparative and cross-cultural analyses and that ‘honor systems are an 
integral part of the process of killing women by their families or intimates, 
regardless of where the woman lives’ (1999, 164). Their theory includes 
three comparative areas related to honour systems – the control of female 
behaviour, male feelings of shame at loss of that control, and community 
participation in “enhancing and controlling this shame.” 
Questioning the stereotypical associations of ‘honour’ with the ‘East’ 
and ‘passion’ with the ‘West’ (Abu Odeh, 1997, 289), or ‘reason’ with the 
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‘North’ and ‘irrational male violence and female passivity’ with the ‘South’ 
(Baker, Gregware and Cassidy, 173) is important both to theory and to 
activism on issues of violence against women. It is important to identify 
commonalities as well as differences in the structure of violence. It is 
important to focus also in the ‘West’ on a gendered construction of self 
involving issues of ownership and control and their role in perpetuating 
violence; and generally to interrogate, in this regard, the application of the 
sexual provocation defence. At the most basic level of comparison, whether 
we are looking at the ‘fit of fury’ in Middle Eastern states, ‘violent emotion’ 
in a heat of passion in Latin America, or ‘extreme emotional distress’ in the 
US, it is clear that societies across the world – through their laws and their 
courts – continue to countenance defences that overwhelmingly benefit 
males committing violence against women.
Playing for the other side
Both the colonial heritage and contemporary global power structures 
(military, political, economic and other) necessarily complicate strategies of 
response to violence against women. In addition to the complexities noted 
above, there are the considerable challenges faced by activists accused of 
playing for, or at least into the hands of, forces ranged against the country 
or community by merely raising the issue of ‘crimes of honour’ as one 
requiring questioning and reform. For example, during one of the debates 
in the Jordanian parliament on amending the Penal Code, certain deputies 
charged that the then recent national campaign and efforts to repeal the 
relevant law were attempts by the West to infiltrate Jordanian society and 
make Jordanian women immoral.6 Such perceptions, first, of immorality 
being endemic in contemporary Western society and second, of the 
dissipating potential on local cultural norms of a hostile agenda of cultural 
imperialism, are widespread within non-Western societies. Activists, 
particularly women’s rights activists, working in their societies on sexuality-
related issues are vulnerable to attack by ‘conservative’ and ‘Islamist’ 
groupings on grounds of ‘inauthenticity’, marginalisation and ‘secularism’. 
On the other hand, as noted by Hannana Siddiqui in this volume in regard 
to the anti-racist left, they may be criticised by ‘progressive’ or left groups, 
as well as by more conservative elements of minority communities, for 
the proverbial washing of dirty laundry in public. Similar tensions can be 
read in Aida Touma-Sliman’s narration of efforts within the Palestinian 
community in Israel. Nazand Begikhani describes how the dependence of 
Kurdish political movements in Iraqi Kurdistan on international support 
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rendered them more responsive to advocacy for change promoted by 
international human rights groups such as Amnesty International, while 
at the same time noting significant internal resentment and resistance to 
the legal changes that followed. Abdullahi An-Na’im’s paper addresses 
this point directly, arguing that different types of advocacy work can and 
should be done by differently-placed actors, but that these need to include 
‘agents of social change’ located inside their communities engaging in 
‘intra-community dialogue’ to contribute to social change from within, 
and pondering the development of appropriate discourses and capacities 
for such work. Strategies – and capacities – differ. As Deniz Kandiyoti 
notes, in a consideration of the related topic of advocacy on the issues of 
gender and citizenship in the Middle East:
Some argue forcefully for the expansion of women’s 
rights as individuals and condemn the stranglehold exercised 
over them by communal and religious forces; others argue for 
working through kinship and communal structures that may act 
to empower and disempower women simultaneously. (Kandiyoti 
2000, xv).
The activists who have written in this book work within their 
communities using the human rights framework, and set out, in their 
different interventions, the use they make of law. Many papers also 
provide examples of how such groups engage with their societies outside 
the processes of the law, seeking to challenge and change social attitudes 
that condone any form of violence against women, joining forces in order 
to strengthen internal voices of resistance.
As for the use by activists of external publicity and pressure, such as 
mobilising international public opinion, in many contexts, complex and 
strategic choices are involved. In 2000, Farah Daghestani told a conference 
on ‘Sexuality in the Middle East’ that ‘honour killings’ of women ‘have been 
responsible for the worst international attention Jordan has received’:
Through the sensationalization of the subject, the Western 
press has contributed to the issue becoming an even greater 
challenge for governments and religious leaders, pitting cultural 
identity and autonomy against cultural imperialism, at the 
expense of women. (Foster, 2001, 24).
It is of course the case that all types of governments tend to ‘blame 
the messenger,’ particularly messengers criticising human rights records. 
| Naming the Crime: ‘Honour’, Rights and Wrongs
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It is also the case that local strategies of response and resistance can be 
complicated and undermined by external factors, which can include well-
meant interventions as well as hostile (eg Islamophobic, or racist) ones, 
and of course global events. These challenges have been illustrated recently 
by the controversy over Norma Khoury’s story of an ‘honour killing’ in 
Jordan, Forbidden Love, withdrawn from sale in Australia by its publishers 
following challenges by Jordanian women’s rights activists to the book’s 
categorisation as a non-fiction ‘memoir’ (see further Abu Hassan in 
this volume). Other illustrations come in the particular challenges of 
combating violence against women in situations of conflict; in this volume, 
Nazand Begikhani, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Aida Touma-Sliman 
all document the reduced attention that activists are able to give (and to 
attract) to these issues in times of military hostilities and threats to the 
particular national entity or community.
Strategising Responses and Creating Alternatives
Thinking through the concept of ‘crimes of honour’ is one way 
of unpicking certain forms of violence against women. At the CIMEL/
INTERIGHTS Roundtable, participants agreed on the strategic 
importance of identifying the value and advantage of, on the one hand, 
separating out a ‘crime of honour’ as a particular phenomenon or form 
of violence against women, and, on the other, campaigning on the various 
manifestations of ‘crimes of honour’ solely within the broader spectrum 
of violence against women. Some felt that caution needed to be exercised 
in not collapsing too many forms of violence against women into the 
category of ‘honour crimes.’ Others felt that while we used the term for 
tactical reasons, and as a convenient short hand to understand certain 
forms of violence, we needed constantly to be alive to our central concern, 
which was not an abstract exercise of disentangling or explicating the 
notion as such, but understanding how it contributes to violence and how 
it violates basic human rights.
Endnotes
1 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68 10 March 1999, para.18.
2 Journalist Rana Husseini made these points to the CIMEL/INTERIGHTS Roundtable: 
see Welchman, 2000, 442.
3 In Newsline, cited in Amnesty International, 1999, 23.
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4 Note that in the UN General Assembly resolution, ‘Working towards the Elimination of 
Crimes Against Women and Girls Committed in the Name of Honour’ (UN Doc. A/C.3/
59/L.25) passed on 15th October 2004, reference to ‘crimes of passion’ was omitted. See 
further Jane Connors and Purna Sen in this volume. 
5 Statement by H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Permanent Representative of 
Jordan, Statement in Explanation of vote, Agenda Item 107: Advancement of Women, 55th 
Session of the General Assembly Third Committee, New York, 3 November 2000.
6 Jordan Times 23 November 1999.
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AMARI REFUGEE CAMP IN 
COMPARISON WITH ITS 
NEIGHBORS
Stability, Transformations, Vulnerability
Penny Johnson
As part of the the Institute’s continuing research on three 
Ramallah-area communities – Amari refugee camp, Masyoun and 
Um Shariet – Penny Johnson, with contributions from Lamis Abu 
Nahleh, wrote an initial profile of Amari refugee camp. Following is 
an abbreviated section from the profile which examines the results of 
a survey conducted by the Institute’s research team1 in 2004 which 
compares data from that year with PCBS data from 1997 from 
the three communities, as well as an additional part of the survey 
which asked households questions about their conditions during 
the present intifada. Ayoub Mustafa coordinated the survey and 
Dr. Rita Gicaman of Birzeit’s Institute of Community and Public 
Health provided critical technical and conceptual assistance, as well 
as a detailed analysis of the survey’s results in tabular form. Tables 
in this article are adapted from her work. The full profile of Amari, 
which includes material from interviews, mapping and secondary 
sources, may be published in whole or part by the Institute as part 
of a series of essays and papers generated by the “three communities” 
research team.
The IWS three communities research project aims to explore, 
among other matters, the meanings of community and neighborhood 
to Palestinian families and individuals experiencing the present war-like 
conditions and the many decades of profound insecurity, lack of freedom, 
and serial economic, political and social shocks. In this framework, Amari 
refugee camp can also be viewed as the most cohesive and self-identified 
of the three communities under study, as well as a place of continued 
dispossession and displacement. However, despite a greater exposure to 
Israeli violence than the other two communities, greater vulnerability to 
poverty, and educational and labor market disadvantages, Amari residents, 
or at least a proportion of them, have made gains in education and in some 
aspects of material well-being.
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Comparing Amari with Um Shariet and Masyoun: 
the 2004 survey and the 1997 census
We can compare the characteristics of Amari households and 
population with the other two neighborhoods under study – Um Shariet 
and Masyoun – through PCBS census data from 1997 and from a 2004 
survey conducted by the IWS team in the three neighborhoods, which 
asked the same questions as the PCBS census in order to compare with 
census data, but also added a section on effects of the second intifada 
on households and families. In both the census and the 2004 survey, 
households and individuals in Amari display some distinct characteristics 
in contrast to their neighbors, although patterns of commonality also 
exist. Both are of interest, particularly given findings of the IWS 1999 
household survey, as well as other studies, of the salience of region as a 
marker of difference, rather than the more traditional urban-rural-camp 
differentiations. In comparing these three contiguous neighborhoods, we 
find both.
Amari is distinct from its neighbors in Um Shariet and Masyoun 
in at least three ways in the survey data: the first is in greater density, 
overcrowding and larger family size, the second is in distinct and 
disadvantaged educational and labor patterns, as well as more faint 
distinctions in population structure and marital characteristics, and the 
third is the special vulnerability of its residents to impoverishment and 
insecurity, as shown particularly in the 2004 data on the effects of the 
second intifada. While these differences may come as no great surprise, 
there is a weaker but quite interesting trend of commonality with one of 
the more unexpected results of the 2004 survey in comparison with 1997: 
namely a continuing increase in the signs and amenities of a globalized 
middle-class life style in all three neighborhoods, whether more higher 
education or more computers and private cars, although this trend is 
certainly much more pronounced in Masyoun and Um Shariet than 
Amari. Nonetheless, the movement towards a middle-class life style 
– even while poverty and unemployment in the camp also increase -- 
reminds us that the Amari population itself is not uniform, and that the 
interim years may have produced more social stratification in the camp 
and differences in resources and opportunities. Indeed, Israeli policies 
of siege and closure, where households who depended on work in Israel 
suffered disproportionately to households with domestic public or private 
sector employment, would also inevitably widen the socio-economic gap 
among refugee camp families. This is, however, contrary to a dominant 
perception. One of our key informants, a lawyer residing in the camp, 
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says, for example: “There is no social or class structure in the camp and 
one doesn’t feel class differences inside the camp because most people 
live at the same economic level and in the same kind of houses and living 
conditions.” 
Stable Community?
While Amari residents may not be uniform in their well-being, 
social status or opportunities, both the IWS survey and PCBS census 
data strongly suggest that the Amari community has a large degree 
of stability in its residents, with 86% of the population (and 92% of 
househeads) reported as living in Amari more than four years in 2004. 
Lesser majorities in the other two communities – 70% in Um Shariet and 
72% in Masyoun—report residencies of more than four years. Even more 
tellingly, about 80% of Amari residents, both in the census and in the IWS 
survey, report having been born in the Ramallah district, with only about 
half of Um Shariet residents and about 58% of Masyoun residents so 
reporting in both surveys. 
Where family members were born, by district
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004
North West Bank 4% 9% 4% 9% 1% 1%
Ramallah 51% 52% 57% 58% 79% 80%
Jerusalem 22% 15% 11% 8% 2% 6%
South West Bank 4% 4% 7% 4% 2% 2%
Gaza 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2%
“1948”* 6% 3% 7% 5% 10% 7%
Abroad 12% 15% 13% 15% 4% 2%
* Born beyond the green line, in either pre-1948 Palestine or post-1948 state of Israel.
While not asked directly, it is clear that a large proportion of the 80% 
of Amari residents born in the Ramallah district were probably born in 
the camp itself. Only 22% of Amari househeads have ever changed their 
place of residence, in contrast to 57% from Um Shariet and 68% from 
Masyoun. Of those who have changed, over half –56% -- moved from 
one house to another in Amari, in contrast to only 12% of Um Shariet 
and 7% of Masyoun residents who moved within the same neighborhood. 
These leaves quite a small percent – about ten percent, some of whom are 
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surely househeads born before 1948 – who have moved from a residence 
outside Amari. What is not captured here, however, and which can be 
found in the interviews, is the stories of those who migrate out of the 
camp. Among our interviewees currently living in Um Shariet are former 
residents who moved out of Amari for reasons of more security and 
greater independence from family. Interviews with families living in Amari 
also describe other kin moving out of the camp to houses or apartments in 
the Ramallah area (primarily Um Shariet and Betunia or describe their own 
actual or planned purchases of land. The camp’s “stability” in population 
then can be questioned, and its “sameness” may rest in the fact that those 
who do not move out may not have the resources to do so, although some, 
especially older women, expressly favor the camp’s familiarity, their roots 
in the camp, and neighborliness. Stability has both negative and positive 
dimensions.
There is, however, another angle in the social cohesion and stability 
of Amari and its neighborhoods. In the 2004 survey, over three-quarters of 
househeads had relatives (of any degree) living in their neighborhood, as 
opposed to less than half of househeads in the other two neighborhoods. 
Over half (52%) of Amari residents had relatives living either the same 
building or an adjoining building as opposed to only a quarter of Masyoun 
residents and about a third of Imm Sharayet residents.
Kin and family proximity can be too close for comfort for some 
households The survey findings also show that a majority of moves for 
Amari residents involve moves within the camp community, with the rate 
for Amari was as high as 56% while for Masyoun and for Imm Sharayet 
was as low as 7% and 12% respectively. Of the reasons why families move 
more frequently within Amari is the desire to separate from the extended 
family, or the need for a larger house, or the desire to buy a house of their 
own. Often, when young people in Amari get married they stay with the 
family as they are unable to afford a house of their own or because land and 
houses are not easily available. Problems and conflict with the in-laws or 
the house crowdedness force them to look for other options. 
Overcrowding, Housing Density, Larger Families
Overcrowding is an aspect of refugee camp life that is pervasive and 
shared by camp residents in various locales and host countries, given 
limited space and growing populations, although there are significant 
differences among camps in different locations. However, most camps 
in the West Bank and Gaza are largely confined to the same parcel of line 
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on which they were established in 1949/50. This is certainly the case with 
Amari. In terms of household crowding, Amari households were twice as 
crowded as households in Masyoun and one and a half times as crowded 
as households in Um Shariet in 1997 (at 2.15 persons per room versus 
1.11 in Masyoun and 1.4 in Um Shariet), and about one and a half times as 
crowded in 2004 as the other two neighborhoods. 
We should also note, however, that these figures may not tell the 
whole story, as it is quite likely that rooms in Amari houses are smaller 
than those in the other two neighborhoods, given standard construction 
of camp dwellings. Indeed, poor indoor environment is another standard 
feature of camp life: women in a 2004 focus group cited space and poor 
conditions in Amari as the main reasons why life outside the camp would 
be better. “I live in a box,” one woman said succinctly. (ICPH 2004) 
Overcrowding is also exacerbated by larger families, with Amari’s 
average household size about one person more than the other two 
neighborhoods in 2004, while the average number of rooms per household 
in Amari was only about three, with the other two neighborhoods closer 
to four (3.7 in Um Sharayet and 3.8 in Masyoun) in 2004. Again, the size 
of rooms is probably to Amari’s disadvantage.
Household size, 1997 and 2004
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004
Average 
household size
5.47 4.97 5.36 4.98 6.23 6.06
Av rooms 
in household
3.9 3.69 4.84 3.8 2.9 2.97
At the same time, Amari has a larger proportion of female-headed 
households, with 11% of houses headed by a women in 2004 (and 12% in 
1997), as opposed to 8% in Masyoun and 4% in Um Sharayet in 2004 and 
8% in both neighborhoods in 1997. In general, female-headed households 
tend to be smaller, particularly when the house-head is an elderly widow, 
and to a lesser extent when the househead has an absent husband. The 
higher proportion of female-headed households in Amari may be related 
both to the higher proportion of the elderly in the camp and slightly 
higher proportions of female widows and divorcees, as well as to slightly 
higher rates of imprisonment.
| Amari Refugee Camp in Comparison with its Neighbors
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Educational Disadvantages 
Both in the 1997 census data and the 2004 survey, residents of 
Amari had a strong educational disadvantage in comparison to the other 
two Ramallah neighborhoods; although all three neighborhoods display 
significant increases in educational levels over time – particularly in post-
secondary education - between 1997 and 2004. Amari, however has far 
lower levels of education that the two neighboring communities: over 
three times as many inhabitants of both Masyoun and Um Shariet (over 20 
years of age) have post-secondary education than Amari residents. 
Education of Individuals, 1997 and 2004
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004
For those 20
Years or over
Illiterate and up to 
6 years
30% 17% 17% 9% 56% 39%
Preparatory 23% 16% 17% 20% 26% 31%
Secondary 20% 23% 31% 24% 10% 16%
Up to Bachelors 24% 39% 28% 42% 8% 13%
More than Bachelors 3% 5% 7% 5% 0.1% 1%
All communities experienced a decline in residents who have only 
elementary education (up to six grade) or are illiterate, but in Amari, this 
level of education is still very prominent at 39%. (It is also much higher 
with house-heads, where 63% of househeads in 1997 and 49% in 2004 had 
an educational level of sixth grade), Age and sex combined are generally the 
most prominent predictor of illiteracy – with a very sharp divide between 
women who benefited from UNRWA education (starting in 1950) and 
those who did not. UNRWA’s provision of free schooling in proximity to 
home, however, only extended through the basic cycle up to ninth grade. 
What may be less age distinct, then, is the continued clustering of Amari 
residents in basic education or less – with over two-thirds of residents over 
20 at basic education or less, and 31% having achieved the full cycle of basic 
education. In our interviews, “basic education” is a common educational 
level reached by middle-aged informants – and interestingly although 
only anecdotely, for younger men dropping out for work in several Amari 
families, while their sisters continue education. One middle-aged woman 
finished basic education in the UNRWA girls school and went on to her 
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first year at the Ramallah Secondary School when the Gulf War started and 
her family withdrew her out of fears for her safety. She sees this withdrawal 
as a turning point in her life, closing opportunities – and leading to early 
marriage.
Given the structure of Palestine’s labor markets, the disadvantage in 
post-secondary education and the clustering in basic education or below is 
particularly significant. Secondary school education in itself is not strongly 
linked to increased job opportunities – it is important as a gateway (and 
often a bottleneck) to higher education, whether at the diploma or 
bachelor’s level, which does offer greater access to work in sectors such as 
health and education, as well as other public sector jobs, NGOs and semi-
professional and professional jobs in the private sector. Basic education or 
below – particularly without other capital, land or other resources – tends 
to place jobseekers in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations, often, for 
Palestinian workers, in the building trades.
Education by Sex by neighborhood, 2004 – those 12 or over, Percentage of sex
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Up to 6 years 28.2(250) 25.2(212) 23.3(60) 21.9(53) 45.9(325) 50.8(10)
Preparatory 20.6(183) 20.4(169) 23.3(60) 24.4(59) 32.1(227) 29.5(180)
Secondary 19.3(171) 21.7(180) 19.4(50) 21.5(52) 12(85) 12.8(78)
Up to BA 26.7(237) 30.5(253) 29.1(75) 30.2(73) 9.3(66) 6.4(39)
More than 
BA
5.2(46) 1.9(16) 5(13) 2.1(5) 0.7(5) 0.5(3)
Despite rising educational levels, Amari’s disadvantage in relation to 
its neighboring communities bears explanation. It seems true that residents 
of Masyoun in particular, but also Um Shariet as whitecollar workers and 
professionals from other regions move into this neighborhood for work, 
have higher educational levels than the national average. But it is also true 
that a “bottle-neck” seems to exist as camp residents finish the preparatory 
cycle where there are obstacles to continuing to secondary education 
– whether in access, family economies, student and family choices, female 
mobility or other reasons. This is probably compounded in the present 
period by the fact that government schools have added a tenth year to the 
preparatory cycle and UNRWA is struggling to keep up. 
| Amari Refugee Camp in Comparison with its Neighbors
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Patterns of Labor: 
Amari disadvantages and Ramallah opportunities
There are broad patterns of labor that are shared by all three 
communities from 1997 to 2004, mainly a decline in crafts and semi-
skilled and unskilled employment and a decline in full-time employment. 
Exclusions from the Israeli labor market and conditions of closure 
and siege are probably largely responsible for this decline. This being 
said, however, the three communities exhibit different advantages and 
disadvantages in these broad patterns, as well as where work is found in 
the present period. For example, in 1997, the proportion of males with 
full time work (15 hours or over) was similar in all three communities 
(at 57-60%) this proportion declined, but at a greater rate in both Amari 
and, less expectedly, Masyoun. Masyoun, however, showed a sharper rise 
in part-time employment than Amari, meaning that at least 50% of the 
male population over ten had some form of employment, while only 40% 
of Amari males had.
Some distinctions are clear. Already in 1997, Masyoun (at 33%) 
and Im Shariet (at 43%) had at least twice as many employed persons 
working as managers, legislators, professionals technicians and associate 
technicians than the national population, where the rate in the census was 
about 17% (PCBS 1999, Table 56, 375-77) – while the national labor force 
had about twice as many persons in this category as Amari (at 6%) Of 
interest as well is that Amari also has a lesser proportion of its workforce 
in these categories than camps in general where the national average was 
14%. Here, the educational disadvantage of Amari, noted above, may well 
translate into a labor disadvantage, even in contrast with residents of camps 
elsewhere in the Palestinian territory – despite its proximity to Ramallah 
and its greater professional, managerial and white-collar opportunities 
Type of Work (for those over 10 and reported as working)
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004 97PCBS 2004
Legislators managers 51% 25% 16%
Professionals technicans 13% 43% 17%
Total above 33% 58% 43% 64% 8% 27%
Clerks and service 22% 22% 28% 25% 22% 29%
Agriculture, machine 
operators, primary 
occupations
20% 11% 12% 4% 44% 25%
Artisans 25% 9% 17% 7% 26% 19%
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Aside from data on work status (full-time, part-time, unemployment, 
housewife, student), where we have both 2004 and 1997 data, other 
employment data is only from our 2004 survey, unless we request more 
data from PCBS. However, this data helps explain the table above by 
looking at economic activity, employment status, sector of employment.
Economic activity by neighborhood/Percentage of neighborhood, 2004
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
Agriculture 2.3% (15) 1.1% (2) 1% (3)
Industry 8.1% (54) 6.9% (12) 15.6% (49)
Construction 6.3% (42) 4.6% (8) 13.3% (42)
Commerce Restaurants & Hotel 20.5% (136) 25.9% (45) 14.9% (47)
Transport & Communication 5.9% (39) 7.5% (13) 7.6% (24)
Services & others 56.9% (378) 54% (94) 47.6% (150)
This table is helpful in showing that the labor force in Amari still 
has a significant presence in industry and construction at almost 30% 
(29.99%), about twice as much as Imm Sharayet (14.4%) or Masyoun 
(11.5%). Amari is somewhat disadvantaged in commerce (and hotels 
and restaurants), probably reflecting less ownership of places of business 
as well as contacts to work there and perhaps educational disadvantages 
as well. What is something of a “black hole” is the largest category of 
“services and other branches,” where all communities have a majority or 
near majority of their work forces. Our survey figures are higher than the 
West Bank average for this category, at 30.9% for persons over 15 working 
in the West Bank in the last quarter of 2004 – although close to Gaza, at 
49.7% in the same quarter. (PCBS 2005) 
When we come to employment status, it is not surprising that Amari 
has by far the lowest percentage of employers (at only 3% in contrast to 
about 13% in the other two neighborhoods). While Masyoun and Amari 
have almost equivalent rates of the self-employed, we can assume that the 
forms of self employment may well diverge. What needs more explanation 
is a fairly high rate of unpaid family work in the other two (more affluent) 
neighborhoods and a very substantial and surprising 28% in Amari. In all 
these tables, our numbers may be too small in any case to be conclusive, 
but this figure is particularly difficult to explain, given that overall figures 
for unpaid family labor in PCBS labor force rounds tend to average 
around 10% for the West Bank, although, interestingly, rising to a high of 
13.9% in the last quarter of 2004. (PCBS, 2005). If we look at who is in 
this category in our 2004 survey data for Amari, we find that the largest 
| Amari Refugee Camp in Comparison with its Neighbors
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occupational category is “Workers in services and selling,” (31%), with the 
second largest category “elementary occupations.” Interestingly, about a 
third (34%) of the persons in this category are women (and 22% wives of 
heads of households), a much higher female rate than in the labor force as a 
whole. About 7% are under 15 and an equal percentage over 65. Although 
we should treat our figures with caution, we can posit than Amari has 
more unpaid family labor than our other neighborhoods, and that women, 
children and the elderly represent close to half of this labor.
Employment status (over 10) by neighborhood/percentage of neighborhood
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
Employer 13.3% (104) 13% (26) 3% (13)
Self employed 11.2% (87) 17% (34) 16.1% (70)
Employee 62.4% (487) 57.5% (115) 53% (231)
Family work
No pay
13.1% (102) 12.5% (25) 28% (122)
Statistically significant p<0.00005
A similar proportion (29%) of the Amari labor force are classifying 
as working “kharaj munshaat” (outside establishments), a category 
which is defined by PCBS simply as “persons who do not work for any 
institution belonging to the aforementioned sector,” (PCBS 1999, 34) 
with the sectors as classified in the table below. (We assume that persons 
working in Israel and the settlements should presumably be classified 
under “private international” but might find their way in the catch-all 
“outside establishments” category as well). Of interest is the much lower 
proportion of the Amari labor force that works in the government public 
sector, at about half (14.1%) that of the other two communities. 
Sector of employment by neighborhood/ percentage of neighborhood:
Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
Private national 59.4% (408) 53.4% (94) 49.7% (159)
Private international 7.3% (50) 6.8% (12) 0.6% (2)
National government 27.5% (189) 25.6% (45) 14.1% (45)
International governmen 1.7% (12) 2.3% (4) 0
NGO 1.3% (9) 0.6% (1) 0
UNRWA 1.3%(9) 1.7%(3) 6.9% (22)
International NGO 0.3% (2) 0 0
Outside Establishments 1.2% (8) 9.7% (17) 28.8% (92)
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If we look at who is in this category of “outside establishments,” 
we find, as in our examination of unpaid family labor, that “workers 
in services and selling” is the largest occupational category (30%), and 
elementary occupations the second largest at 19%. While some of the 
persons classified in both categories may be the same, there is no clear 
conflation of these two categories, since only 12% of the people who work 
“outside establishments” are women, while 34% of those classified as 
“unpaid family labor” are women.
While we may get more clarity with more manipulation of data – or 
more comparisons with PCBS 1997 census data – one tentative conclusion 
is that labor classifications have a real but limited value in capturing 
patterns of labor in Amari – and that Amari camp residents relation to 
employment, labor histories and daily experiences of work are hard to 
categorize in such a simple manner.
Markers of Modernity? : Amenities and Lifestyle 
As noted in the introduction, one of the more interesting results 
of the 2004 survey was continuing increase in the signs and amenities of 
a “globalized” middle-class life style in all three neighborhoods, although 
the trend was significantly weaker in Amari. The increase in higher 
education analyzed above is of one of these markers, along with an increase 
in computers, satellite dishes, private cars, mobile phones, and household 
appliances. These are perhaps crude markers for much more complex 
processes, as modernity (and its many versions) is a highly charged and 
contested term in itself ’
The following table shows all the rate of increase in household 
amenities and durables in Amari between 1997 and 2004. A quick look at 
the figures for Amari show that a rise in the ownership of all household 
items. The highest increase is found in the ownership of home telephone-
earth (from 6% to 39%), computers (from 1.2% to 25%) and private cars 
(from 13% to 33%). While in 1997 none of the households had central 
heating, in 2004, 2% had it installed in their houses. The rates of owning 
satellites and mobiles which show only for the year 2004 are not low. 
Amari households: Possession of amenities, 1997 and 2004
Household item   1997  2004
Private car    13%  33%
Fridge    90%  96%
| Amari Refugee Camp in Comparison with its Neighbors
layout-V3E.indd   90 09/11/1426, 05:32:58 ã
91Review of  Women Studies |
Solar heater    55%   62%
Central heating   0%   2%
Potogaz    86%  97%
Home Library   9%  11%
Washing Machine  79%  88%
Television   89%  94%
VCR Machine   22%  27%
Computer   1.2%  25%
Telephone-earth   6%   39%
Mobile    no data   67%
Satellite    no data   65%
What does our data show in comparing the three communities? 
First, the possession of basic household appliances – a washing machine, 
a refrigerator and a television – were universal (99-100%) in Masyoun and 
Im Shariet in 2004, and highly prevalent (93-97%) in Amari, although 7% 
still did not possess a washing machine, 4% did not possession a fridge, 
and 3% no television. A small percentage in Amari (3-5%) shared these 
appliances with other households. 
About a third of Amari houses do not have a mobile phone, and 
a similar percentage (30%) do not have a satellite dish, while only 4% 
of Masyoun households do not have a dish and 14% of Um Sharayet 
households. In a similar vein, only a quarter of Amari households have 
a home computer, while over two-thirds of Masyoun (60%) and over 
half of Um Sharayet (53%) have a computer at home. Amari is clearly 
disadvantaged, but at the same time, an overwhelming majority of Amari 
households are watching satellite television and have access to mobile 
phones, while computer usage has increased dramatically. 
Amari and the Al Aqsa Intifada: Target for Repression
The most striking difference between Amari and the other 
communities is the substantially higher effects of Israeli violence and 
repression. Survey results in the table below which show Amari having the 
highest rates among the three communities of injuries, deaths, arrests and 
temporary detention of family members. 
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Imm Sharayet Masyoun Amari
2004 2004 2004
Injury of at least one Member of the family 
at least once
11% 9% 28%
Death of at least one Member of the family 
or relativest
10% 3% 15%
Arrest of at least one Member of the family 16% 14% 30%
Temporary detention of at least one 
member of the family
39% 44% 70%
That this finding might have been anticipated only underlines the 
“taken for granted” fact that camps and camp residents are special targets 
of Israeli repression. It is here that another definition of community begins 
to emerge – a community by necessity, by resistance and by history – that 
will best be explored through the ethnographic interviews that are central 
to the three communities research project.
Endnotes
1 Members of the research team were Rula Abu Dahu, Lamis Abu Nahleh, Jamil Hilal, 
Penny Johnson and Lisa Taraki. Amira Silmi joined the team after the survey.
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Meeting the Housing Needs of Palestinian 
Women and Men: 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Eileen Kuttab, Randa Nassar, Lina Mi’ari
At the request of the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) and the Palestinian Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (PMHC), a team of researchers from the Institute 
of Women Studies at Birzeit University conducted a multi-
dimensional examination of the housing situation and policies 
in Palestine from a gender perspective in order to ultimately 
aid the creation of a commercially viable and gender sensitive 
financial institution that facilitates the flow of capital in support of a 
Palestinian housing industry. The practical purpose of this research 
was to empirically validate the issues raised in a previous desk study 
“Gender Analysis of the Palestinian Mortgage Loan Insurance 
Facility Policy.” 
The team used multiple research methods, including two 
studies on the legal system related to housing and property rights 
from a gender perspective and qualitative and quantitative surveys 
on individuals from the population of Ramallah area at large and 
from key informants from various governmental, commercial, and 
civil institutions related to property, mortgage and housing in order 
to identify any informal and formal attitudinal and behavioral 
barriers that restrict women’s access to and control over land, 
property, housing and mortgage. The team also analyzed the content 
of literature and bylaws of local institutions involved in housing, 
and mortgage 
The excerpt from the study below presents some of the 
main findings of the quantitative survey regarding attitudes and 
awareness of women and men towards property rights, and the 
conclusions and recommendations of the report. The full report can 
be found in the library of the Institute of Women’s Studies.
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The research team, headed by Institute Director Eileen Kuttab, 
included Dr. Randa Nasser (Birzeit University Department of 
Sociology), Lina Miari (Institute of Women’s Studies. Birzeit 
University’s Institute of Law conducted the analysis of existing 
property legislation in Palestine, and Dr. Anan Odeh undertook 
the study of procediures in property disputes at the Court of First 
Instance and District Court of Ramallah.
Survey results: 
Awareness and attitudes regarding property and inheritance 
rights for women
Attitudes and awareness of people regarding women’s access, control 
over and ownership of land, housing and any other form of property and 
issues related to woman’s inheritance and her status in general among the 
130 people we interviewed (80 females and 50 males) were very supportive, 
not withstanding the small difference between men and women. As a 
matter of fact, the observed men’s support for woman’s rights to own 
property and inheritance is surprisingly quite high. With respect to 
attitudes towards women’s right to acquire and keep property in her name, 
97.5% of the women and 94% of the men supported such right. Regarding 
woman’s rights to receive her inheritance, 100% of the women and 96% of 
the men supported the practice, while 96% of the women and 94% of the 
men thought that women should keep their inheritance to themselves. 
However, it seems that both men and women do not quite grasp the 
discriminatory nature of the norms and traditions of their society regarding 
women’s right to inheritance and ownership of property and presume that 
they are gender blind. For example, 68% of the women and 80% of the men 
thought that the norms and traditions of the society support women’s right 
to inheritance and ownership of property. The people we interviewed feel 
confident that the societal norms are in congruence with their own personal 
support for women’s rights to inheritance and property ownership. What is 
surprising here is the women’s stance. Why would women perceive a gender 
neutral value system when by all means it is not so? 
However, when asked about their knowledge regarding the reality 
of gender differentials in rights and in access to opportunities, 81% of 
the women and only 20% of the men thought that in their society men 
have more rights and greater access to opportunities than women. Women 
stance here is more reasonable and consistent with reality than their 
previous stance towards values and norms, but the question of interest 
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is what makes men so oblivious to what actually happens in their society 
regarding gender equities? This requires further conceptual and empirical 
investigation, but some immediate logical and of the head interpretations 
may shed some light on this fact. It could be because in the last fifteen years 
or so, women’s overly embellished demand for their rights gave men the 
illusion that they (the women) have already received all their rights. That 
is, the gender equity discourse alone created the illusion that gender parity 
has been achieved in reality. What is even more alarming is the erroneous 
idea among men (which we tapped in another research among Palestinians 
and it is also quite common among white men in the US) that now they are 
the oppressed gender, claiming that their job opportunities are being high-
jacked by women. Another explanation could be that men accept whatever 
rights and opportunities given to women now to be reasonable and 
sufficient and do not lag behind men’s rights and opportunities. However, 
when asked if women should be granted the same rights and opportunities 
as those granted to men, 42% of the men and 78% of the women agreed 
and strongly agreed to this stance. This is quite frankly an unexpectedly 
high male’s support for gender equity within the existing cultural context, 
and by all means, it should be taken as a bright ray of hope for future 
gender relations in Palestine (hoping that this sample reflects the actual 
society, though, as indicated above, it is not a random sample).
Property attainment for women may not be possible without their 
ability to secure finances. Therefore, we felt it is important to tap the extent 
to which women’s participation in the labor market is accepted by men and 
women alike. The responses to the question about women’s right to work 
outside the house were amazingly positive: 94% of the females and 76% 
of the males supported this right, and further, 91% of the women and 64% 
of the males thought that woman’s work outside the house improves her 
ability to take decisions related to her family’s affairs. What is of interest 
here, is the fact that a good majority of the men supported women’s 
right to work (76%), but this proportion remains to be significantly less 
than that of the women (94%). Women are obviously the forerunners of 
their issues, but in a colonized society that is plagued by dependency, 
underdevelopment and overall backwardness, which perpetuate existing 
and also produce particular forms of patriarchy, these medium to high 
percentages of men in the sample who support women’s equality and 
right to work (42% of the men support equal rights for women and 
76% support women’s employment outside the house) point to a livelier 
consciousness towards greater gender equities than is reasonably expected. 
Policies, therefore, aught not overlook this encouraging reality and they 
should invest in its perpetuation and proliferation. 
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Awareness regarding laws of inheritance and organizations 
promoting property right for women
The subjects’ awareness of and support for the law of inheritance is 
telling of how people bestow support to laws if they are aware that these 
laws are associated with religion, irrespective of their content. For example, 
only 22% of the women and 10% of the men indicated their support to the 
civil law of inheritance, but when asked if they support the religious Shari’a 
law of inheritance, the picture was reversed: 85% of the women and 90% 
of the men supported it. This is a significant finding because the content 
of the civil law of inheritance is the same as the shari’s law. As for their 
knowledge about any advocacy groups and organizations which promote 
awareness on women’s rights to property, 44% of the women and 38% of 
the men knew of such organizations.  
Actual practice regarding gender inequalities in ownership of 
property and access to inheritance and income
In this section we assess the actual behavior of people regarding 
gender equities/inequities in ownership of land, housing and other 
productive property as well as their attainment of their inheritance 
among the Palestinians interviewed and at the national level, where data is 
available. The survey results show that overall, 38% of the men and 12.5% 
of the women own one of the following forms of property: land (8% 
& 2.5% for males and females respectively), house (18% & 5%), business 
(2% & 1.3%), and an automobile (10% & 3.8%). It is clear that women’s 
ownership of these four forms of property is significantly less than the 
men’s, but the low ownership figures among the men is also noteworthy; 
reflecting the poor state these interviewed men and women live under. At 
the national level, these percentages are somewhat better for both genders, 
particularly in land and housing ownership: land ownership (24% & 5%), 
house (52% & 8%), business (13% & .2%), and an automobile (15% & 
1.0%) for men and women respectively. National level data suggest that 
women’s ownership in land and housing is 5% and 8%, respectively (PCBS 
1999).  
Results from our survey and from the national survey suggest 
that though housing ownership is modest for both men and women in 
Palestine, it is quite smaller for women, and therefore any national housing 
plan that is determined to be gender sensitive must focus on bridging the 
gender gaps in land and housing ownership, but more importantly, it must 
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focus on the means by which women gain the ability to access them, i.e. 
work with adequate pay. 
The source and entitlement of the property owned by people in 
the study may be an important piece of information for market analysts. 
This simply gauges whether women do acquire or buy property on their 
own or not, and if they register it in their names once they acquire it. 
From the ten women who own property, 30% have bought it themselves 
before or after marriage. But because the number of those who actually 
purchased the property they own either before or after marriage in our 
sample is only 3 women, we recommend caution in the interpretation of 
this figure. From the men who own property, however, 45% have bought 
it themselves before or after marriage. The rest of the property is either 
acquired through inheritance or other unspecified means. 
Property tenure among women and men, though to a lesser extent, 
does not fully correspond with their self-proclaimed ownership. Only 
five of the ten women who indicated that they own one form of property 
have this property registered in their names (50%), while 19 of the 24 men 
who own property (79%) have their property registered in their names. 
We think that this is due to the low rates of divorces in this country and 
hence lack of awareness about the various unfortunate possibilities that 
can harm women if her property is not registered in her own name if and 
when divorced. Also women in this part of the world trust their men 
(whether it is genuine or due to societal pressures and expectations) and 
do not prepare themselves for a future situation of conflict and division 
of property. Some of the women we interviewed in more depth suggested 
that interpretation. In addition there may be a type of stigma associated 
with women’s attempt to gain entitlement over their property.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Conclusions
1- It is clear that the Palestinian laws, the public, and the housing and 
mortgage institutional officials and terms do not embrace clear and 
obvious gender biases against women regarding housing and property 
rights and access to mortgage. In practice, however, as the research 
demonstrated, the picture is not as rosy. Women’s ownership of land, 
housing, and businesses is significantly less than that of men. At the 
national level, the percent of men and women, respectively, who own 
land is (24%, 5%), housing (52%, 8%), and business (13%, .2%). 
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2- It is important to note that both men and women’s ownership of 
property is scanty in the occupied territories, reflecting the poor, 
underdeveloped socioeconomic conditions that people live under. 
And, hence, any housing and mortgage venture should strategize in 
this very important area.
3- Women’s participation in the labor market is quite low (14% of the 
women in the working age work in all of the occupied territories) and 
their income is insufficient to qualify them for mortgage loans (in our 
survey about 30% of the working women are in the 2000 NIS or less 
monthly income category. Although, the men situation in this regard 
is much worse: 50% of the men are either unemployed and/or their 
income is 2000 NIS and less)
4- There is some space for Palestinian women to become empowered in 
her household regarding issues that involve her personally or those 
of the household affairs. Our survey results revealed that women are 
fairly involved in the decision to obtain a mortgage loan to purchase 
a home: 5% make this decision on their own all the time, 3% make 
this decision more than their husbands, and 43% make this decision 
jointly with their husbands. As we indicated earlier in the results 
section, women’s role in the decision making process becomes much 
more significant in personal issues.
5- There is a high demand for both housing and mortgage loans among 
both men and women in the survey (over 65% of the men and women 
who live in owned homes desire to purchase another home, and 53% 
of the women and 68% of the men are willing to obtain a loan to 
purchase a home, while among the renters, these figures are much 
higher: 78% of the women and 83% of the men desire to leave their 
rented dwelling to purchase a home, and 65% of the women and 58% 
of the men are willing to obtain a loan to do so). This suggests that 
among the renters women are more willing than men to obtain a loan 
to purchase a home while among those who live in tenured homes 
men are more willing to do so, though this is mitigated by the place of 
residence i.e. this pattern changes according to the place of residence, 
as shown above in the results section.
6- The demand for housing and mortgage is most acute among the 
renters, the camp residents, the poor, and least among city dwellers, 
rich women and among those who have a BA degree.
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7- Knowledge about mortgage sources and terms does not seem to be 
wide spread among the people in our survey. Women’s knowledge 
about institutions which lend money for home purchase is by far 
less than that of the men among those who live in owned homes 
(18% and 45%, respectively) and among the renters (26% and 42%, 
respectively). As for knowledge about the loan terms, women also 
have less knowledge than men (25% and 58%, respectively, among 
those living in tenured homes and 48% and 67%, respectively, among 
the renters). This knowledge was mostly gained from other individuals 
and not from any of the media sources such as newspapers, and the 
other electronic media sources. 
8- People for the most part harbor fear for loans and mortgage. 60% of 
both men and women who live in tenured homes have fear to obtain 
a loan to purchase a home, and 48% and 83% for women and men, 
respectively, fear loans among the renters. Women among the renters 
are much more determined and less afraid to obtain a loan for house 
purchase than men, and thus they should be targeted by mortgage 
companies. People are really more willing to get a loan than they 
actually do so and they harbor lots of fear around the acquisition of 
a loan to purchase a home. While over 50% of the males and females 
whether they are renters or live in tenured homes indicated willingness 
to obtain a loan to purchase a home, less than 25% of them actually 
attempted to get a loan and 60% of them fear loan acquisition.
9- From the second legal study on court cases, it was obvious that 
more men are claimers than defendants as they obviously use courts 
more than women. Yet, it was also true that some women have used 
the legal courts, which theoretically means that women can become 
claimers for their rights. Of course, as the qualitative study with 7 
women indicated there are a host of social and economic pressures 
that prohibit them from doing so. In addition, it was clear that 
most of the cases end up with reconciliation and women’s rights are 
compromised due to social pressures.
10- The discourse of the courts is male-oriented and hence it assumes 
that the judicial system is not gender sensitive. 
11- With the exception of the religious courts, civil laws are gender 
neutral and this neutrality reflects itself in male presence. 
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12- Most of the institutions that deal with housing and mortgage are 
governed by gender neutral frameworks that deal with beneficiaries 
as citizens and which indirectly means that women are not targeted. 
Whereas, other institutions are gender biased and deal with mortgage 
issues in a discriminatory way like asking the approval of the husband 
for a mortgage that is applied for by a woman, or the use of male 
discourse in the application forms. A general understanding of most 
of the institutions is based on the assumption that by benefiting 
the family, it is benefiting all the members of the family including 
women.
13- An important conclusion is that most of the mortgage companies 
or institutions do not interfere in the registration of property which 
leaves women with no legal protection or right especially in cases of 
divorce or death of husbands.
14- There is clear indication that gender neutral policies disregard gender 
roles in addition to women’s needs especially those of poor women 
and female headed households. Furthermore, this gender neutrality 
disregards the gender gap in the society and the cultural practices that 
discriminate against women. As a result, gender biases and power 
relations are perpetuated and maintained which deprive women to 
benefit from the different housing schemes and limit their access to 
mortgage that is based on commercial competitive basis. 
15- Interviews of women’s institutions have indicated that women’s 
organizations have not yet put women’s housing rights as a 
priority issue on their agenda. It became clear that even women’s 
organizations that give loans to women have limited it to small loans 
and to productive projects.
16- The relationship between women’s work and access to decision 
making is more complicated than we anticipated. It has been indicated 
that some women who are working have expressed a positive relation 
between women’s waged work and decision making. Yet in the 
quantitative and qualitative survey there was a clear indication that 
most of the decisions that relate to the family as a whole are joint 
decisions, but the personal decisions concerning women’s affairs 
become one of the issue that can differentiate between women’s 
empowerment, who have more space and opportunity to bargain and 
make decisions than women who are economically dependent.
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17- We can conclude that one of the main issues that can threaten 
women’s ownership rights is the cultural value of family’s unity and 
coherence. Such a value plays a negative role in challenging women’s 
inheritance rights especially in terms of housing and land.
18- Most women have more knowledge of the Sharia inheritance laws 
than the Palestinian Legislation. Yet due to the gender neutrality of 
the Palestinian legislation, women should be more aware of such laws 
as they can have more space for manipulation in terms of equal gender 
rights. 
Recommendations
1- It has been indicated that a gender neutral policy can not bring 
women into compatible status with men. Due to the existing gender 
gap and due to discrimination against women in real practice gender 
specific policies become more relevant and necessary to bridge the 
gap between women and men. To enable women and give them more 
equitable opportunities policies that are targeted to women’s needs 
and rights should be promoted.
2- One other recommendation that can be developed based on the 
findings is that registration of ownership should become one of the 
policy issues of mortgage institutions similar to te women’s signature 
on the loan application. Mortgage institutions should not only use 
women for loan payments but should also give them legal status for 
ownership.
3- New kinds of mortgage institutions should be developed that can 
benefit from gender specific policies to be able to target women. 
Although it is difficult to talk about specific policies at this stage, it is 
important to review different low-income housing schemes that have 
been developed in other countries of the world and can be of use to 
our situation. 
4- Based on this and the results of the legal studies and the in-depth-
interviews, we believe that a housing institution which coordinates 
between all involved parties to make it possible for women to achieve 
the necessary requirements to obtain the means to own their own 
homes for themselves and their families is necessary. This institution 
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should provide job placement service for women, career development 
and training.
5- A gender review of low-income housing schemes should be conducted 
to be able to design the appropriate mortgage framework for the low-
income households including female headed households. This review 
should concentrate on successful global experiences where poor 
women have been able to attain housing loans.
6- Because women’s organizations have no experience in dealing with 
housing mortgage, there is a need to develop their skills in attending 
and managing such loans in a gender sensitive framework.
7- The women’s organizations should increase their efforts to utilize the 
Palestinian legislation for women’s housing rights. Hence they should 
raise the women’s awareness in the importance to use Palestinian 
legislation and make it their reference framework as it can give more 
access to manipulation in attainment of gender rights.
8- Policy makers, and staff within mortgage institutions including 
private institutions and Banks should be trained in gender planning 
frameworks so that their policies become more gender sensitive. 
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